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425 
SEARCHING FOR THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD: 
STOPS, SEIZURE, AND THE REASONABLE PERSON’S 
WILLINGNESS TO WALK AWAY FROM THE POLICE 
Desiree Phair

 
Abstract: A person is “seized” by an officer, and thus entitled to Fourth Amendment 
protections, if a reasonable person would not feel free to leave. Although courts must set a 
standard for when a person has been seized by an officer, few real-world studies exist 
regarding when individuals feel truly free to disregard the police. In addition, gathering new 
data poses challenges. This Comment presents newly produced data sets and then explores 
adjustments to the current reasonable person standard, arguing the advantages of focusing on 
officer actions as opposed to the current focus on whether a defendant feels “free to leave.” 
This Comment begins with an overview of the standards set by the United States 
Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Washington regarding when a reasonable person 
would feel free to terminate a police interaction. Next, the Comment discusses nuances and 
exceptions seen within other reasonable person standards. The Comment then reviews the 
psychological and social science research regarding laypersons’ difficulty resisting authority 
figures. David Kessler’s 2009 study—indicating that most respondents feel uncomfortable 
refusing to cooperate with police, even during “social” interactions—receives in-depth 
attention. 
This Comment next presents an original study that asks two population samples the 
Kessler questions. Neither result precisely mirrors the Kessler study result. Washington voter 
survey respondents indicated a higher comfort refusing the police than hypothesized; 
recovery center survey respondents provided a more bifurcated response pattern to the 
standard questions and offered qualitative commentary regarding how disabilities may 
impact an individual’s perceived freedom to leave an officer interaction. 
Following the data analysis, the Comment discusses whether courts should add more 
nuance to the existing reasonable person standard by accounting for potential vulnerabilities 
within the civilian population. If courts follow this path, they would benefit from the ability 
to review additional studies before finalizing such updates.  The Comment ultimately argues, 
however, that other jurisdictions should follow Washington’s lead and focus on objective 
officer actions when determining whether a social contact has evolved into a seizure. 
Focusing on officer choices will provide more predictable and socially just results than 
delving into the subjective experience of a hypothetical “reasonable” suspect. 
                                                     
 J.D. Candidate 2017, University of Washington School of Law. M.A., Economics, California 
State University Fullerton; M.A., Education, Claremont Graduate University. Thank you to 
Professors Michael Townsend, Jessica West, and Anna Roberts for their insightful comments. 
Thank you to the University of Washington Center for Social Science Computation and Research 
(CSSCR) and Valentina Petrova for feedback concerning quantitative and qualitative methodology 
summations. Thank you to David Donnan and Jan Trasen for topic inspiration. This research was 
supported in part by a stipend from University of Washington Law School Dean Kellye Testy. 
During the summer of 2015, the author worked as an intern assisting with defense appeals, 
including at least one appeal touching on the line between social interaction and seizure.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence encompasses the boundaries of a 
search or a seizure, whether the police had probable cause to search or 
seize, and the consequences if authorities search or seize without 
probable cause—which typically includes exclusion of the improperly 
obtained evidence.
1
 A seizure occurs when a reasonable person would 
have, “in view of all the circumstances surrounding the 
incident . . . believed that he was not free to leave.”2 Phrased differently, 
“[i]f a reasonable person would feel free to terminate the encounter, then 
he or she has not been seized.”3 
Searches and seizures typically require a warrant; however, courts 
have developed a plethora of exceptions to the warrant requirement, 
including the following: (1) exigent circumstances,
4
 (2) “Terry”5 stops, 
and (3) searches incident to arrest.
6
 The first exception, exigent 
circumstances, covers urgent situations where waiting for a warrant 
would increase the chance of harm or loss.
7
 For example, authorities 
may enter a burning building without a warrant but require judicial 
approval before entering charred building remains to search for evidence 
of arson.
8
 The second exception, Terry stops, occurs when an officer 
briefly interrupts an individual due to alleged suspicious activity; 
warrantless searches are permissible but limited to a pat down frisk for 
weapons.
9
 If police exceed that boundary, searching for items outside of 
plain view that are clearly not weapons, courts must suppress the 
evidence.
10
 Jurisprudence concerning the third exception, searches 
incident to arrest, is an evolving doctrine that could itself fill an entire 
paper, particularly given the number of abrogated United States Supreme 
                                                     
1. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 231–32 (2011) 
(explaining practical purpose of excluding evidence obtained via improper seizure). 
2. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (plurality opinion). 
3. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201 (2002). 
4. Riley v. California, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2486 (2014) (referencing some case-by-case 
warrant exceptions, including that for exigent circumstances). 
5. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). 
6. See Davis, 564 U.S. at  234–35 (summarizing rule regarding search of an automobile incident 
to arrest as outlined in Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009)).  
7. See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978). 
8. Id. at 515–16.  
9. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373 (1993). 
10. Id. at 373 (citing Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 65–66 (1968)).  
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Court cases on the subject.
11
 In short, the risk of harm to officers and 
destruction of evidence outweighs most arrestee privacy concerns 
involving physical objects. Although the Court has typically supported 
police leeway, it has firmly required the government to obtain a warrant 
before searching mobile phones and the personal data therein when 
conducting incident-to arrest-searches.
12
 
While the above warrant exceptions focus primarily on issues related 
to search, a “social” stop involves everyday police interactions that fall 
short of formal detention, search, or arrest.
13
 Courts perform a fact-
intensive analysis to determine whether a social interaction has morphed 
into something more.
14
 A police officer commenting on the local sports 
team or inquiring about the welfare of people sitting in a car is not 
engaged in a “seizure”; on the other hand, a social contact is a 
“voluntary, consensual encounter between the police and a subject with 
the intent of engaging in casual and/or non-investigative conversation.”15 
Courts must establish a seizure standard that maintains civilians’ 
rights while allowing officers to perform their duties.
16
 The courts 
should not prevent police from making conversation or engaging in 
community policing activities.
17
 Nonetheless, police must not disregard 
official procedures under the guise of socializing with a suspect,
18
 and 
                                                     
11. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), abrogation recognized by Davis, 564 
U.S. 229; United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), abrogated by California v. Acevedo, 500 
U.S. 565 (1991); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), abrogation recognized by Davis, 564 
U.S. at 229. In addition, many cases not abrogated are nonetheless not followed on grounds of state 
law. See, e.g., Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009); Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004).  
12. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484–85 (2014) (declining to extend United 
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)). 
13. State v. Harrington, 167 Wash. 2d 656, 664, 222 P.3d 92, 95–96 (2009). 
14. See, e.g., id. at 666, 222 P.3d at 96; State v. Soto-Garcia, 68 Wash. App. 20, 22, 841 P.2d 
1271, 1272 (1992), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Thorn, 129 Wash. 2d 347, 917 P.2d 108 
(1996). 
15. SEATTLE POLICE DEP’T, SEATTLE POLICE DEP’T MANUAL 6.220 (2015), 
http://www.seattle.gov/police-manual/title-6-arrests-search-and-seizure/6220-voluntary-contacts-
terry-stops-and-detentions [https://perma.cc/P4DJ-TMPK] (providing department policy for 
voluntary contacts, Terry stops, and detentions). 
16. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 565–66 (1980) (plurality opinion). 
17. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, UNDERSTANDING COMMUNITY 
POLICING: A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION (1994), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/commp.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7D44-VF9C] (labelling community policing “an approach that may very well 
enhance and maximize performance and resources”). 
18. For an extreme example of an officer blurring the line between official duties and socializing, 
see People v. Becker, No. 52142(U), slip op. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 3, 2013). 
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courts must indicate limits on what constitutes reasonable police 
behavior in these contexts.
19
 
In searching for the proper limits, courts may look to social science 
and psychology research to support or weaken the justification for 
maintaining the current seizure standard.
20
 New data sources could 
illuminate whether the average person would indeed feel free to leave, 
what fact patterns might lead ordinary individuals to insist on enhanced 
protections—or, alternatively, when the average person might agree with 
granting police more leeway.
21
 
This Comment provides an overview of the seizure standards at the 
federal level and within Washington State. Part I examines evidence (or, 
in many cases, the lack thereof) supporting those state and federal 
standards. Section I.A discusses the United States Supreme Court’s “free 
to leave” variant of the “reasonable person” standard in detail. Section 
I.B explores how the Supreme Court of Washington’s “free to leave” 
standard aims to uphold the state constitution’s more restrictive privacy 
requirements.
22
 Part II reviews existing legal frameworks for analyzing 
and adapting the reasonable person standard in a variety of contexts. Part 
III discusses previous studies relating to subjects’ willingness to 
disregard actors in positions of authority, particularly the 2009 Kessler 
study.
23
 
The Comment’s next Parts introduce fresh data on individuals’ 
willingness to refuse the police, making recommendations regarding 
potential future studies and adjustments to the reasonable person 
standard. Part IV examines a telephone survey of registered Washington 
voters who were asked questions nearly identical to those from the 
Kessler study and then discusses data gathered from a smaller sample of 
addiction recovery center clients. Part V compares the new data to the 
2009 Kessler results, noting that the new data and Kessler data conflict. 
Part VI suggests how researchers and courts should respond to this 
recent social science research. Contrary to some earlier data, the newly 
                                                     
19. See Radley Balko, When the ‘Reasonable Police Officer’ Standard Isn’t Reasonable at All, 
WASH. POST (Dec. 17, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2015/12/17/ 
when-the-reasonable-police-officer-standard-isnt-reasonable-at-all/?utm_term=.696fb2b4446f 
[https://perma.cc/V3YA-ZBA4]. 
20. See infra Parts II–III. 
21. See generally John Monahan & Laurens Walker, A Judges’ Guide to Using Social Science, 43 
CT. REV: J. AM. JUDGES ASS’N. 156, 156–63 (2007), http://aja.ncsc.dni.us/publications/courtrv/ 
cr43-4/CR43-4Monahan.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z26N-V2V9] (article contained within Issue 4). 
22. See WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
23. David K. Kessler, Free to Leave? An Empirical Look at the Fourth Amendment’s Seizure 
Standard, 99 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 51, 68 (2009). 
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presented study indicates that many ordinary civilians feel comfortable 
refusing to cooperate with a police officer during what the courts would 
consider a “social” contact—but some subpopulations report feeling 
fearful, and not all relevant subpopulations have been tested. If federal 
or state courts wish to update the reasonable person standard to account 
for challenges faced by vulnerable civilians, they should have the 
opportunity to review additional data; unfortunately, gathering and 
accurately explaining such data presents challenges. Instead, instructing 
fact finders to focus on officers’ actions, rather than hypothesizing how 
suspects should feel, will allow for more just outcomes when 
determining whether a social contact has evolved into a seizure. 
I. THE “SOCIAL STOP” REASONABLENESS RULE PROTECTS 
CIVILIANS FROM INTERFERENCE WHILE ALLOWING 
POLICE TO PERFORM THEIR DUTIES 
The judiciary must navigate the tension between protecting 
individuals from unnecessary government intrusion and allowing 
officers the freedom to engage in effective police work.
24
 The United 
States Supreme Court has established that a show of force without 
physical restraint constitutes a seizure when “a reasonable person would 
have believed that he was not free to leave.”25 The Supreme Court of 
Washington follows a similar “free-to-leave” standard but maintains that 
the state constitution provides broader individual protections.
26
 
A. The Federal Standard Assumes that Most People Feel Free to 
Walk Away from Law Enforcement 
The United States Supreme Court free-to-leave standard sets a “high 
bar for the kinds of encounters that qualify as ‘seizures.’”27 Laypersons 
may face a number of situations in which courts retroactively label an 
exchange with law enforcement “voluntary.” Distinguishing between 
seizures and voluntary exchanges affects evidence admissibility and the 
bounds of constitutionally acceptable policing. 
The United States Constitution protects individuals from unlawful 
searches and seizures.
28
 Specifically, the Fourth Amendment guarantees 
                                                     
24. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 565–66 (1980). 
25. Id. at 554. 
26. State v. Harrington, 167 Wash. 2d 656, 664, 222 P.3d 92, 95 (2009). 
27. See Kessler, supra note 23. 
28. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . and no 
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.”29 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence leaves the door open for an 
evolving definition of seizure. Commenting on the reasonableness 
standard and the lack of data regarding the average person’s definition of 
seizure, Justice Scalia quipped during an oral argument, “Maybe we can 
just pass [on defining the standard] until the studies are done?”30 During 
the same oral argument, Justice Breyer elaborated: 
So what do we do if we don’t know? I can follow my instinct. 
My instinct is he would feel he wasn’t free because the red 
light’s flashing. That’s just one person’s instinct. Or I could say, 
let’s look for some studies. They could have asked people about 
this, and there are none . . . . What should I do? . . . Look for 
more studies?
31
 
Judges have used their own instincts regarding what members of the 
public consider reasonable and when an average individual feels 
seized.
32
 According to the Court’s elaboration on the free-to-leave 
standard, evidence of a seizure can include “the threatening presence of 
several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical 
touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of 
voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might be 
compelled.”33 Consequently, the free-to-leave standard depends upon a 
fact-intensive, case-by-case analysis.
34
 
Scenarios involving officers interacting with airport travelers provide 
concrete examples of the line between whether an individual is at liberty 
or seized. When talking with plainclothes government agents who 
“request” to see identification and ask a few questions, the Court 
considers a passenger “free to leave.”35 In contrast, the Court considers 
an individual seized when agents isolate the person in a room, retain a 
passenger ticket and driver’s license, and specifically call out that the 
                                                     
29. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
30. Transcript of Oral Argument at 43, Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249 (2007) (No. 06-8120) 
(quoted in Kessler, supra note 23, at 51). 
31. Id. (quoted in Kessler, supra note 23, at 51). 
32. See Should Judges Use Instinct?, TRANSFORM JUSTICE (Feb. 4, 2016), 
http://www.transformjustice.org.uk/should-judges-use-evidence-or-instinct/ [https://perma.cc/VV24 
-RZGP].  
33. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).  
34. See id. at 555. 
35. Id.  
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person is suspected of a crime.
36
 Declaring that a subject is literally or 
effectively under arrest distinctly indicates seizure.
37
 
The free-to-leave test hinges on whether a person would feel free to 
cease interacting with law enforcement, not necessarily whether the 
person would feel free to physically leave the area. The Court has ruled 
that members of the public would feel free to end a conversation if 
questioned on a public sidewalk or on a bus.
38
 In Florida v. Bostick,
39
 the 
Court noted that the free-to-leave standard was an inappropriate test on a 
Greyhound bus because a person on a bus would not feel free to 
disembark regardless of the officer’s presence. “[T]he appropriate 
inquiry is whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the 
officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.”40 
The Court more often assumes that police officers have seized a 
person within a car because a traffic stop involves interrupting the mode 
of travel.
41
 
An officer who orders one particular car to pull over acts with an 
implicit claim of right based on fault of some sort . . . . [E]ven 
when the wrongdoing is only bad driving, the passenger will 
expect to be subject to some scrutiny, and his attempt to leave 
the scene would be so obviously likely to prompt an objection 
from the officer that no passenger would feel free to leave in the 
first place.
42
 
The Court considers it sufficient for a seat-bound bus passenger to 
feel free to decline an officer’s request despite a limitation on his 
freedom to disembark, focusing on details such as whether the officer 
used a quiet tone of voice,
43
 yet the test for a curb-bound car passenger 
remains whether the person would feel free to leave the scene.
44
 
The United States Supreme Court free-to-leave standard establishes a 
challenging test—particularly for those in scenarios, such as traveling 
                                                     
36. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501 (1983). 
37. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948) (holding that an individual allowing a 
hotel room search after being told she should consider herself under arrest did not constitute the 
suspect giving the officer voluntary consent). 
38. Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 101 (2005). 
39. 501 U.S. 429 (1991). 
40. Id. at 436. But cf. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 311 (2000) (discussing the 
unacceptable pressures to conform felt by non-religious audience members listening to a 
loudspeaker prayer delivered at a school football game). 
41. See Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 257 (2007). 
42. Id. 
43. See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 204 (2002).  
44. See Brendlin, 551 U.S. 249. 
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long distances on a bus, not often experienced by members of the 
Court.
45
 The Supreme Court of Washington standard, though still 
connected to a free-to-leave analysis, attempts to provide greater 
protections.
46
 
B. Washington Also Uses a “Free to Leave” Standard, but Its 
Constitution Provides Somewhat More Protection than the Fourth 
Amendment Protections Against Searches and Seizures 
The Supreme Court of Washington has adopted a standard very 
similar to the federal free-to-leave approach.
47
 The Washington State 
Constitution, however, generally provides broader privacy protections 
(and thus greater search and seizure protections) than those rooted in the 
Fourth Amendment.
48
 Under the Washington Constitution “[n]o person 
shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without 
authority of law.”49 This Washington clause “is not limited to subjective 
expectations of privacy but, more broadly, protects ‘those privacy 
interests which citizens of this state have held, and should be entitled to 
hold, safe from governmental trespass absent a warrant.’”50 
This privacy right feeds directly into an overall standard for what 
constitutes a seizure: “a seizure occurs, under article I, section 7, when 
considering all the circumstances, an individual’s freedom of movement 
is restrained and the individual would not believe he or she is free to 
leave or decline a request due to an officer’s use of force or display of 
authority.”51 Washington courts aim to make this determination by 
objectively looking at the actions of the law enforcement officer.
52
 
Although similar to the federal standard, the Washington standard 
reflects the state’s high regard for privacy and thus leads to more 
                                                     
45. See Kessler, supra note 23, at 58. 
46. See, e.g., State v. Rankin, 151 Wash. 2d 689, 694, 92 P.3d 202, 204 (2004); State v. O’Neill, 
148 Wash. 2d 564, 584, 62 P.3d 489, 500 (2003); State v. Jones, 146 Wash. 2d 328, 332, 45 P.3d 
1062, 1064 (2002). 
47. O’Neill, 148 Wash. 2d at 574, 62 P.3d at 495.  
48. See, e.g., Rankin, 151 Wash. 2d at 694, 92 P.3d at 204; O’Neill, 148 Wash. 2d at 584, 62 P.3d 
at 500; Jones, 146 Wash. 2d at 332, 45 P.3d at 1064. 
49. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
50. State v. Parker, 139 Wash. 2d 486, 494, 987 P.2d 73, 78 (1999) (quoting State v. Myrick, 102 
Wash. 2d 506, 511, 688 P.2d 151, 154 (1984), abrogated on other grounds by Brendlin v. 
California, 551 U.S. 249 (2007)). 
51. Rankin, 151 Wash. 2d at 695, 92 P.3d at 204 (citing O’Neill, 148 Wash. 2d at 574, 62 P.3d at 
495).  
52. State v. Young, 135 Wash. 2d 498, 501, 957 P.2d 681, 682 (1998). 
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protective outcomes in some cases.
53
 Treatment of passenger suspects 
during a traffic stop provides an example of the differing levels of 
protection provided by the federal free-to-leave standard as compared to 
the Washington free-to-leave standard. When examining a passenger’s 
right to suppress evidence taken from a traffic stop, the United States 
Supreme Court in Brendlin v. California
54
 held that passengers are 
(rightfully) seized along with the driver from the moment of the stop.
55
 
Before Brendlin, the Supreme Court of Washington had ruled that, 
unless officers have an articulable safety concern, passengers have an 
affirmative right to walk away from a car that has been pulled over for a 
traffic violation, and passengers may move to suppress evidence 
gathered during a traffic stop on the basis of the police having no right to 
detain the passenger in the first place.
56
 
Attempting to provide heightened state constitutional protections still 
requires drawing the line between socializing and seizing. In 
Washington, a social contact “occupies an amorphous area in [the 
state’s] jurisprudence, resting someplace between an officer’s saying 
‘hello’ to a stranger on the street and, at the other end of the spectrum, 
an investigative detention (i.e., Terry stop).”57 Not every conversation 
between police officers and citizens constitutes a seizure, and optimal 
law enforcement strategies may require interaction with individuals out 
in public.
58
 However, escalating police conduct may transform an 
interaction from a social contact into a seizure.
59
 
State v. Harrington
60
 provides a classic example of contact escalation. 
In the Harrington case, a single police officer hailed the defendant 
without using his emergency lights or siren; the officer parked out of 
                                                     
53. See, e.g., Rankin, 151 Wash. 2d at 694, 92 P.3d at 204; O’Neill, 148 Wash. 2d at 584, 62 P.3d 
at 500; Jones, 146 Wash. 2d at 332, 45 P.3d at 1064. 
54. 551 U.S. 249 (2007). 
55. Id. at 257. 
56. State v. Mendez, 137 Wash. 2d 208, 970 P.2d 722 (1999), abrogated by Brendlin, 551 U.S. 
249. As of this Comment, the Washington State Supreme Court has not reviewed a post-Brendlin 
scenario in which a passenger asserts that the police have no right to detain him or her in the first 
place. In the most recent prominent case on a somewhat related topic, State v. Flores, 186 Wash. 2d 
506, 510–11, 379 P.3d 104, 107 (2016), officers were interacting with the pedestrian companion of 
a known gang member; there was no automobile involved. 
57. State v. Harrington, 167 Wash. 2d 656, 664, 222 P.3d 92, 95 (2009); see also Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). 
58. Harrington, 167 Wash. 2d at 665, 222 P.3d at 96. 
59. See id. at 666, 222 P.3d at 96; State v. Soto-Garcia, 68 Wash. App. 20, 22, 841 P.2d 1271, 
1272 (1992), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Thorn, 129 Wash. 2d 347, 917 P.2d 108 
(1996). 
60. 167 Wash. 2d 656, 222 P.3d 92 (2009).  
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sight, remained within Harrington’s field of view while approaching, 
and asked for permission to speak to Harrington—all of which the Court 
considered a social contact.
61
 The Court held that subsequent actions 
“quickly dispelled the social contact, however, and escalated the 
encounter to a seizure.”62 The non-exclusive factors that indicate 
whether a seizure has occurred include the arrival of additional police 
officers, the request to remove hands from one’s pockets, the display of 
a weapon, the request to search or frisk, and the request for 
identification.
63
 Of particular note, the Harrington Court cited cases in 
which other jurisdictions held that the presence of multiple officers did 
not constitute seizure,
64
 but it disagreed with these other jurisdictions 
and held that a “second officer’s sudden arrival at the scene would cause 
a reasonable person to think twice about the turn of events and, for this 
reason [the second officer’s] presence contributed to the eventual seizure 
of Harrington.”65 
Similar to the United States Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of 
Washington has made it clear that labeling an interaction a “seizure” has 
important consequences, holding that “[t]he exclusionary rule mandates 
the suppression of evidence gathered through unconstitutional means.”66 
Even during a Terry detention, police may not search beyond performing 
a safety frisk for weapons, and courts exclude evidence gathered from 
any search that goes beyond said frisk.
67
 
Washington largely follows the federal reasoning for dividing a social 
interaction from a seizure, but the state diverges from the federal 
standard by providing more protection when the state deems necessary.
68
 
The Supreme Court of Washington has held that the federal standard 
focuses too much on the subjective defendant mindset and that courts 
provide better guidance for police officers when focusing on objective 
                                                     
61. Id. at 665, 222 P.3d at 96. 
62. Id. at 666, 222 P.3d at 96.  
63. Id. at 667–68, 222 P.3d at 97; State v. Young, 135 Wash. 2d 498, 512, 957 P.2d 681, 688 
(1998) (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)) (accepting examples of 
police actions likely resulting in seizure). 
64. Harrington, 167 Wash. 2d at 666, 222 P.3d at 96 (citing People v. Robinson, 909 N.E.2d 232, 
243 (Ill. 2009); United States v. Jones, 523 F.3d 1235, 1237, 1242 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. 
Buchanon, 72 F.3d 1217, 1224 (6th Cir. 1995)). 
65. See supra note 64. 
66. State v. Garvin, 166 Wash. 2d 242, 254, 207 P.3d 1266, 1272 (2009) (discussing 
unconstitutional seizure prior to arrest). 
67. Id. at 249, 207 P.3d at 1270 (citing State v. Duncan, 146 Wash. 2d 166, 176, 43 P.3d 513 
(2002)). 
68. See Young, 135 Wash. 2d at 510, 957 P.2d at 687. 
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police actions.
69
 The remainder of this Comment explores research-
based and normative arguments for other jurisdictions to embrace the 
Washington approach and for refining the Washington “reasonable 
person” standard to further clarify when a social interaction ends and a 
seizure begins—and from whose perspective to draw the line. 
II. COURTS CAN PROTECT CIVILIANS BY INCLUDING 
ALLOWANCES FOR DEFENDANTS’ PERSONAL 
CHARACTERISTICS OR BY FOCUSING ON THE 
REASONABLENESS OF POLICE ACTIONS TOWARD THE 
CIVILIAN 
This section explores current reasonable-person-standard exceptions 
for persons with disabilities, children, and women, as well as 
“reasonable actor” requirements applied specifically to police officers. 
Tort law provides protection for persons with disabilities.
70
 Courts allow 
special exceptions for child actors.
71
 Exceptions for the “reasonable 
woman” also exist in some contexts, but receive harsh criticism from 
multiple scholars.
72
 At times, rather than analyzing a civilian’s actions, 
the courts provide protection to civilians by insisting on officer 
reasonableness.
73
 This patchwork of exceptions and protections leaves 
room for reinterpreting reasonable person standards as research and 
society progress. 
A. Disabled Persons Face a “Reasonable Disabled Person” Standard 
Rather than the More General “Reasonable Person” Standard 
Although some scholars argue that individual actors should bear the 
cost of their own good or bad “luck,”74 the prevailing tort negligence 
standard adjusts for most disabilities. An actor “with a physical 
disability is negligent only if the conduct does not conform to that of a 
reasonably careful person with the same disability.”75 When considering 
                                                     
69. See id. at 507–10, 957 P.2d at 685–87 (criticizing the United States Supreme Court’s 
reasoning and ultimately rejecting the subjective standard in California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 
(1991)). 
70. See infra sections II.A–B. 
71. See, e.g., J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 273 (2001). 
72. See infra section II.C. 
73. See infra section II.D. 
74. ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LAW 84–87 (2001).  
75. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 11(a) (AM. 
LAW INST. 2010).  
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whether an actor exercised due care, a jury may consider that person’s 
physical disability, such as legs of differing lengths
76
 or blindness.
77
 
Sudden incapacitation due to a physical condition such as heart attack or 
epileptic seizure will also excuse otherwise negligent conduct.
78
 In 
contrast, the people with mental illness or mental disability face the 
same standard of care as a person of sound mind
79—but scholars 
advocate for updating the reasonable person negligence standard for 
those with mental illnesses and mental disabilities as well.
80
 As 
discussed later in this Comment,
81
 courts could draw on the rationale for 
carving out a “reasonable disabled person” standard in the tort context 
and similarly establish a “reasonable disabled person” standard in the 
Fourth Amendment free-to-leave context.  
B. Children Receive Protection Under a Differentiated Standard 
Children also frequently receive disparate treatment under the law. 
“The law has historically reflected . . . that children characteristically 
lack the capacity to exercise mature judgment and possess only an 
incomplete ability to understand the world around them.”82 Courts may 
                                                     
76. See Sterling v. New England Fish Co., 410 F. Supp. 164, 166–67 (W.D. Wash. 1976).  
77. Hill v. Greenwood, 100 N.W. 522, 524 (Iowa 1904). 
78. See, e.g., Walker v. Cardwell, 348 So. 2d 1049, 1052 (Ala. 1977); Goodrich v. Blair, 646 P.2d 
890, 892 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982); Lutzkovitz v. Murray, 339 A.2d 64, 67 (Del. 1975); Watts v. Smith, 
226 A.2d 160, 161–62 (D.C. 1967); Burns v. Grezeka, 508 N.E.2d 449, 452 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); 
Holcomb v. Miller, 269 N.E.2d 885, 887 (Ind. Ct. App. 1971); Freese v. Lemmon, 267 N.W.2d 680, 
684 (Iowa 1978); Rogers v. Wilhelm-Olsen, 748 S.W.2d 671, 673 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988); Brannon v. 
Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 507 So.2d 194, 197 (La. 1987); Moore v. Presnell, 379 A.2d 1246, 1248 (Md. 
Ct. Spec. App. 1977); Murphy v. Paxton, 186 So.2d 244, 246 (Miss. 1966); Storjohn v. Fay, 519 
N.W.2d 521, 526 (Neb. 1994); Word v. Jones, 516 S.E.2d 144, 147 (N.C. 1999); Jenkins v. Morgan, 
566 N.E.2d 1244, 1248 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988); Parker v. Washington, 421 P.2d 861, 866 (Okla. 
1966); Van Der Hout v. Johnson, 446 P.2d 99, 102 (Or. 1968); Howle v. PYA/Monarch, Inc., 344 
S.E.2d 157, 159 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986); McCall v. Wilder, 913 S.W.2d 150, 155–56 (Tenn. 1995); 
Witt v. Merricks, 168 S.E.2d 517, 518 (Va. 1969).    
79. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 11C (AM. 
LAW INST. 2013) (“An actor’s mental or emotional disability is not considered in determining 
whether conduct is negligent, unless the actor is a child.”). 
80. See, e.g., Kristin Harlow, Applying the Reasonable Person Standard to Psychosis: How Tort 
Law Unfairly Burdens Adults with Mental Illness, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1733, 1735–36 (2007) (“To be 
consistent and fair, mentally ill defendants should have a subjective standard for determining 
liability that is consistent with their particular disability, just as a subjective standard is available for 
defendants with physical disabilities.”); Harry J. F. Korrell, The Liability of Mentally Disabled Tort 
Defendants, 19 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 1 (1995).  
81. See infra section VI.B.1. 
82. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 273 (2001). 
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release children from contracts made before the age of majority.
83
 Tort 
law across many states also makes exceptions for children, providing 
that they should be compared to those of similar age and experience.
84
 
More closely related to the Fourth Amendment issues raised in this 
Comment, the United States Supreme Court recently declared in no 
uncertain terms that children should face a different standard than adults 
in the context of police interactions.
85
 Courts should not inquire into the 
“actual mindset” of individual suspects, but courts and police must 
recognize that “a reasonable child subjected to police questioning will 
sometimes feel pressured to submit when a reasonable adult would feel 
free to go . . . [C]ourts can account for that reality without doing any 
damage to the objective nature of the custody analysis.”86 The Court 
considers children’s special vulnerability “self-evident to anyone who 
was a child once himself, including any police officer or judge.”87 
This reasoning, from J.D.B. v. North Carolina,
88
 has potentially broad 
implications. Although a “social” stop and a Terry stop both differ from 
the formal Miranda
89
 custody discussed in J.D.B., arguably the three 
may blur together as conversation turns to command turns to restraint. 
The assumptions and logic applied to how to define custody bear a 
distinct resemblance to the assumptions and logic concerning whether 
police have “detained” a suspect as part of a Terry stop.90 Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence dismisses the assertion that having an existing 
general safeguard eliminates the need for erecting more specific 
protections, a proposition with analogies beyond Miranda custody 
scenarios: 
[T]he State and the dissent suggest that . . . the due process 
voluntariness test independently accounts for a child’s 
youth . . . . To hold, as the State requests . . . would be to deny 
                                                     
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 14 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“Unless a statute 
provides otherwise, a natural person has the capacity to incur only voidable contractual duties until 
the beginning of the day before the person’s eighteenth birthday.”). 
84. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 10(a) (AM. 
LAW INST. 2013) (“A child’s conduct is negligent if it does not conform to that of a reasonably 
careful person of the same age, intelligence, and experience”). 
85. J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 271. 
86. Id. at 272. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. at 261. 
89. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
90. See generally Katherine M. Swift, Drawing a Line Between Terry and Miranda, 73 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1075, 1083 (2006).  
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children the full scope of the procedural safeguards 
that Miranda guarantees to adults.
91
 
Although the United States Supreme Court has done less to shield 
individuals during investigatory stops than it has done to shield 
individuals from interrogation,
92
 the “self-evident”93 fact that children 
perceive the world differently than adults at least raises questions as to 
what other categories may require protecting those with a distinctly 
different worldview. Other potentially vulnerable groups may aspire to 
similar, case-appropriate, individuated standards. In addition to the 
exceptions for disabled persons, discussed above,
94
 some exceptions 
account for ways that the female viewpoint may differ from the male 
viewpoint. 
C. Feminist Theory Critiques the “Reasonable Woman” Standard 
Despite some application of a “reasonable woman” exception,95 
courts and scholars have struggled with the ways that a “reasonable 
woman” may differ from a “reasonable man.”96 The reasonable woman 
archetype has appeared, to mixed reviews, in cases concerning rape 
(how much would the reasonable woman resist),
97
 domestic violence 
(when might the reasonable woman feel threatened),
98
 and sexual 
harassment (would the reasonable woman consider the environment 
hostile).
99
 This Comment now turns to the ways in which scholars have 
critiqued, and occasionally supported, using a standard differentiated by 
gender. 
The arguments for adopting a reasonable woman standard may be less 
clear than those for adopting exceptions and protections for the disabled. 
At least three different theories underlie the justification for a reasonable 
woman standard.
100
 The first, “difference” theory, suggests that women 
                                                     
91. J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 280–81 (Kenndy, J., concurring). 
92. Compare Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968), with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 
444 (1966). 
93. J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 272. 
94. See supra section II.A. 
95. See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 880 (9th Cir. 1991); State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 
811, 820 (N.D. 1983). 
96. See Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797, 798 (1987). 
97. Naomi R. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language: The Reasonable Woman Standard in 
Theory and in Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1398, 1401 (1992). 
98. See, e.g., State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572 (Kan. 1988).  
99. See, e.g., Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991). 
100. See Cahn, supra note 97, at 1401. 
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as a group tend toward nurturing and morality, and thus women as a 
group behave differently than men.
101
 This approach may suffer from 
accepting the “compliments of Victorian gender ideology while rejecting 
its insults.”102 A second and related theory, “difference-as-dominance,” 
concerns the power relationships within a system that has historically 
excluded female perspectives—and the importance of including 
women’s experiences when setting policy today.103 The third theory, 
critical race studies theory, challenges whether rules that exclude the 
experiences of outsiders are ever truly “neutral.”104 
Whatever the chosen theoretical underpinning, in the past, when men 
have determined the outlines of the reasonable woman standard, scholars 
have observed that the standard served as a paternalistic straightjacket 
rather than as a layer of protection for women.
105
 For example, in 
criminal law concerning rape, the test for whether the woman resisted as 
much as a “reasonable” woman was developed by men “to protect other 
men who, in their eyes, were wrongfully accused of rape.”106 
Reasonableness standards in the areas of sexual harassment and 
domestic violence had more female input at the outset, and thus suffer 
from less bias regarding how women “should” behave.107 
Scholars have also argued that the historical view of women as 
emotional beings, perhaps incapable of rational thought, makes it 
difficult to ever divorce a “reasonable person” standard from the 
underlying “reasonable man” reference point.108 Yet, men have received 
leeway when giving in to emotions in certain contexts, particularly 
manslaughter of a female partner in the “heat of passion.”109 Some 
feminists also note that using a reasonable man standard in sexual 
                                                     
101. Id.; see also Williams, supra note 96, at 798 (discussing the contrast between the struggle to 
encourage consideration of every man and woman as an individual as opposed to the possibility of 
making useful group characterizations). 
102. Williams, supra note 96, at 807. 
103. Cahn, supra note 97, at 1401; see also Catherine A. MacKinnon, Legal Perspectives on 
Sexual Difference, in THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL DIFFERENCE 213, 214–15 (Deborah 
L. Rhode ed., 1990). 
104. See Cahn, supra note 97, at 1401. 
105. See id. at 1402. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
108. See Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, The Reasonable Person, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 323, 362 
(2012). 
109. Antonia E. Miller, Inherent (Gender) Unreasonableness of the Concept of Reasonableness 
in the Context of Manslaughter Committed in the Heat of Passion, 17 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 
249, 249 (2010) (quoting Judge Cahill: “I seriously wonder how many men married five, four years 
would have the strength to walk away without inflicting some corporal punishment.”).  
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harassment cases with male victims tends to reinforce societal 
stereotypes concerning masculinity, resulting in reduced protection for 
men who do not conform to those stereotypes and who may be at the 
most risk for sexual harassment.
110
 
In light of the potential for misuse, courts may prefer to avoid a 
“reasonable for the gender” standard. On the other hand, adapting a 
blanket or modified version of any reasonable person standard can serve 
useful social goals when approached from a normative (i.e., how 
members of society should behave) rather than a positive (i.e., how 
members of society do behave) perspective.
111
 One feminist normative 
approach uses a standard of “reasonable care,” requiring a “conscious 
concern for the possible consequences of our actions or inactions for 
another person’s safety or health.”112 This standard may prove difficult 
to apply to female defendants arguing that a particular stop actually 
constituted a seizure, but it may form the basis for a “reasonable police 
officer” standard, as discussed immediately below. 
D. Police Officers Face Particularized Standards for Acting as a 
“Reasonable Person” 
Although the United States Supreme Court has noted that a case-by-
case approach may not always “provide a workable accommodation 
between the needs of law enforcement and the interests protected by the 
Fourth Amendment,”113 police officers nonetheless face many flexible, 
reasonableness-based standards dependent on the totality of the 
circumstances. For example, courts structure exceptions to the warrant 
requirement based on the reasonableness of officers acting without a 
warrant in the individual situation: “[t]o the extent dangers to arresting 
officers may be implicated in a particular way in a particular case, they 
are better addressed through consideration of case-specific exceptions to 
the warrant requirement, such as the one for exigent circumstances.”114 
Similarly, Wilson v. Arkansas
115
 refused to set exact parameters for 
the “knock and announce” rule, holding that “[t]he Fourth Amendment’s 
flexible requirement of reasonableness should not be read to mandate a 
                                                     
110. See, e.g., Ann C. McGinley, Reasonable Men?, 45 CONN. L. REV. 1 (2012). 
111. See generally Miller & Perry, supra note 108.  
112. Id. at 365. 
113. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984). 
114. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2486 (2014). 
115. 514 U.S. 927 (1995). 
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rigid rule of announcement.”116 Courts also judge the brief suspect 
detentions during Terry stops reasonable or unreasonable based on the 
overall set of circumstances.
117
 The Supreme Court analyzing a Terry 
stop or a “knock and announce” interaction does not generally indicate 
that keeping a defendant for thirty-one rather than thirty minutes will 
destroy an otherwise constitutional action.
118
 On the contrary, courts 
frequently employ Wilson’s flexible requirement, asking officers to use 
professional judgment and evaluate the totality of the circumstances.
119
 
The flexibility and reasonableness standards apply outside of the 
officer exception context. For example, in a civil rights violation suit, an 
officer loses qualified immunity if the officer’s actions do not meet an 
“objective reasonableness” standard.120 Courts may apply the 
reasonableness analysis to multiple stages of a police officer’s 
interaction with a suspect, with the officer failing at any point. The 
United States Supreme Court has explained that courts should examine 
actions of government actors leading up to a seizure.
121
 One federal 
appellate court has held that courts should “carve up the incident into 
segments and judge each on its own terms to see if the officer was 
reasonable at each stage.”122 The Supreme Court of Washington also has 
indicated that officers should conduct themselves reasonably during 
suspect stops.
123
 
Courts may wish to extend the inquiry into officer actions to 
additional scenarios.
124
 Because the police officer is the authority figure 
                                                     
116. Id. at 934. 
117. See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709 (1983) (declining to adopt a specific time 
limit for length of a stop, but holding that, on the facts of the case, a ninety-minute seizure was 
unacceptable). 
118. See id. 
119. See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395 (1997) (ruling that it was reasonable for 
officers to enter a motel room without knocking when defendant might imminently dispose of 
evidence); Coleman v. United States, 728 A.2d 1230, 1235 (D.C. 1999) (holding that police with a 
warrant using a ruse to gain peaceful entry into a home acted reasonably).  
120. See St. Hilaire v. City of Laconia, 71 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 1995) (citing Anderson v. 
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638–39 (1987)). 
121. Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989) (noting that actions leading up to a 
suspect’s ceasing movement might in some circumstances indicate a tort rather than a seizure).  
122. Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1150 (7th Cir. 1994). But see Dickerson v. McClellan, 101 
F.3d 1151 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting the importance of only holding officers accountable for 
knowledge they had at the time of the alleged civil rights violation).  
123. State v. Young, 135 Wash. 2d 498, 512, 957 P.2d 681, 688 (1998) (noting with approval that 
“[b]ased on the totality of the circumstances, the deputy acted reasonably in seeking to renew his 
contact with Young”).  
124. See infra section VI.B.2. 
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in a position of power in most officer-non-officer scenarios, formulating 
standards to drive officer behavior may prove simpler and more effective 
than attempting to measure or shape laypersons’ choices. As discussed 
in Part III, below, instructing or encouraging laypersons to disregard 
authority often proves unexpectedly difficult. 
III. PREVIOUS STUDIES DEMONSTRATE LAYPERSONS’ 
DIFFICULTY REFUSING REQUESTS FROM AUTHORITY 
Previous studies have demonstrated that civilians rarely feel free to 
ignore authority figures. Researchers have conducted a number of 
queries examining subjects’ actions when commanded by an official, 
responses to requests from those in uniform, behavior adaptions when 
warned in advance of rights, and willingness to interact with police, each 
discussed in turn below. Electric shock experiments
125
 and experiments 
testing laypersons’ reaction to those in uniform126 show that most people 
comply with requests from authority figures. Studies covering warnings’ 
effect on voluntary consent further support that civilians tend to 
acquiesce.
127
 Finally, a thorough study testing willingness to refuse 
police indicates laypersons’ discomfort with avoiding officers.128 
A. Electric Shock Experiments Show that Individuals Tend to Do 
What They Are Told 
In a famous series of 1960s experiments (“the Milgram 
experiments”),129 Stanley Milgram demonstrated the difficulty with 
saying “no” to an authority figure. Milgram invited subjects to a lab to 
train “learners” (actually actors playing a role) via shock treatment.130 
Subjects administered shocks with progressively higher voltages when a 
learner answered incorrectly; officials in lab coats insisted that subjects 
continue with the experiment despite the agonizing pleas for help and 
screams from the actors.
131
 The Milgram experiments show the degree to 
which an ordinary person will comply with orders from authority 
                                                     
125. See STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW 3–6 (1974). 
126. See generally Leonard Bickman, The Social Power of a Uniform, 4 J. APPLIED SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 47 (1974). 
127. See, e.g., Illya Lichtenberg, Miranda in Ohio: The Effects of Robinette on the “Voluntary” 
Waiver of Fourth Amendment Rights, 44 HOW. L.J. 349, 353–54 (2001). 
128. See Kessler, supra note 23. 
129. See MILGRAM, supra note 125.  
130. Id. at 3–4. 
131. Id. at 4. 
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figures, with Milgram commenting that “[r]elatively few people have the 
resources needed to resist authority. A variety of inhibitions against 
disobeying authority come into play and successfully keep the person in 
his place.”132 
Milgram further observed that “values are not the only forces at work 
in an actual, ongoing situation. They are but one narrow band of causes 
in the total spectrum of forces impinging on a person.”133 In one 
particularly noteworthy experiment variation, even when subjects signed 
a contract with the “learner” stating that the learner had a heart condition 
and could opt-out, sixteen of forty subjects shocked the learner to the 
maximum voltage.
134
 
Far from a historical relic, Milgram’s results have been replicated 
within the last decade by social psychologist Jerry M. Burger:
135
 
“[p]eople learning about Milgram’s work . . . point to the lessons of the 
Holocaust and argue that there is greater societal awareness of the 
dangers of blind obedience. But what I found is the same situational 
factors that affected obedience in Milgram’s experiments still operate 
today.”136 Modern researchers have attempted to answer what motivates 
acquiescing to authority. One experiment using an implicit measurement 
indicated that obeying orders actually reduced subjects’ sense of agency 
(as opposed to reports of reduced agency, which may be motivated by 
the desire to avoid punishment).
137
 A different update to the Milgram 
experiments questions whether some dutiful behaviors originate from 
fear rather than mere blind obedience.
138
 For one subject, an overseer’s 
absence of emotion triggered fright without the need for yelling or a 
                                                     
132. Id. at 6. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 66.  
135. Jerry M. Burger, Replicating Milgram: Would People Still Obey Today?, 64 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 1, 1 (2009), https://www.apa.org/pubs/journals/releases/amp-64-1-1.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/357B-D858]. 
136. Researcher Finds Most Will Inflict Pain if Prodded, WASH. POST (Jan. 5, 2009), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/05/AR2009010501173.html 
[https://perma.cc/SC7U-EKPD] (quoting Jerry Burger). 
137. Emilie A. Caspar et al., Coercion Changes the Sense of Agency in the Human Brain, 26 
CURRENT BIOLOGY 585 (Mar. 7, 2016), http://www.cell.com/current-biology/pdfExtended/S0960-
9822(16)00052-X [https://perma.cc/KEV5-DWSP]. 
138. Michael Shermer, What Milgram’s Shock Experiments Really Mean: Replicating Milgram’s 
Shock Experiments Reveals Not Blind Obedience but Deep Moral Conflict, SCI. AM. (Nov. 1, 2012), 
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/what-milgrams-shock-experiments-really-mean/ 
[https://perma.cc/RY2Q-3TQL]. 
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show of weapons: “I didn’t know what was going to happen to me if I 
stopped. He just—he had no emotion. I was afraid of him.”139 
These insights are relevant to judges or laypersons who envision 
certain default reactions when police confront a civilian. Taking into 
account typical overconfidence in one’s own abilities140 and Milgram’s 
experimental observations, judicial “gut” instincts and survey respondent 
claims serve as an upper limit of the likelihood of resisting authority. 
The “he had no emotion”141 note in the update to Milgram’s experiment 
should also inform what constitutes “use of language or tone of voice 
indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might be 
compelled.”142 
B. Experiments from Bickman and Bushman Show that People Follow 
Instructions from Those in Uniform 
In the years following the Milgram experiments, psychologists 
explored factors that might affect authority figure influence. The impact 
of uniforms received particular attention and validation. 
Renowned psychologist Leonard Bickman ran an experiment testing 
the effects of wearing a uniform.
143
 Passersby saw an ordinarily dressed 
person, or a person dressed as a milkman, or a person dressed as a 
security guard.
144
 Those asked by the “security guard” to pick up litter 
complied significantly more often than those asked by an ordinarily 
dressed person or a person dressed as a milkman.
145
 When Brad 
Bushman ran an experiment with similar methodology but replaced the 
security guard figure with someone dressed as a fireman, compliance 
rates were also higher for requests from the fireman than they were for 
requests from someone ordinarily dressed.
146
 
                                                     
139. Id. 
140. Isabelle Brocas & Juan D. Carillo, Are We All Better Drivers Than Average?: Self-
Perception and Biased Behaviour, CTR. FOR ECON. POLICY RESEARCH (Oct. 2002) (discussing a 
preliminary model of testing our imperfect self-knowledge and noting the extensive psychological 
literature concerning the propensity to consider oneself better than average).  
141. See Shermer, supra note 138. 
142. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (plurality opinion). 
143. See Bickman, supra note 126. 
144. Id. 
145. Id.; see also Ric Simmons, Not “Voluntary” but Still Reasonable: A New Paradigm for 
Understanding the Consent Searches Doctrine, 80 IND. L.J. 773, 800–01 (2005) (discussing that 
people presented with the fake security guard rarely failed to cooperate, regardless of how much 
they insisted on their confidence level before the interaction). 
146. See Brad J. Bushman, Perceived Symbols of Authority and Their Influence on Compliance, 
14 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 501, 506 (1984).  
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Several years later, Bushman conducted a similar experiment testing 
whether the status conferred by dress applied equally to female authority 
figures. Bushman found a difference in compliance rates depending on 
dress, with higher compliance when the woman issuing a command 
wore a uniform as compared to the level of compliance when a woman 
wore a suit or casual clothing.
147
 His work verified previous hypotheses 
that uniforms are influential because they serve as a certificate of 
legitimacy.
148
 
Bickman and Bushman supplied valuable information regarding the 
way laypersons respond to requests from those in uniform. Their studies 
suggest that, when discussing civilian interaction with the police and the 
likelihood that regular people will simply walk away in the middle of the 
conversation, most people automatically comply with those utilizing the 
“certificate of legitimacy.”149 
C. Warnings Regarding Rights Do Not Lower the Rate of Consent 
The Milgram experiments show that laypersons tend to do what 
authority figures tell them to do,
150
 but laypersons also conform to 
officers’ wishes even when they are told explicitly that they may decline. 
Although some choose to believe that informing a suspect of his or her 
rights—the Miranda151 right to remain silent and the Robinette152 “right” 
to refuse a search—will benefit suspects,153 research indicates no 
significant effect of a warning on a subject’s tendency to allow police 
intrusion.
154
 Perhaps the presence or absence of a verbal warning does 
not explain the “subtle factors that may overcome the subject’s will.”155 
In at least one study, willingness to allow a vehicle search increased 
                                                     
147. Brad J. Bushman, The Effects of Apparel on Compliance: A Field Experiment with a Female 
Authority Figure, 14 PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 459, 463 (1988).  
148. Id. at 465. 
149. Id. 
150. See MILGRAM, supra note 125. 
151. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
152. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996) (holding, contrary to the implication of the phrase 
“Robinette warning,” that warnings prior to searching a vehicle are not required). 
153. See Press Release, Am. Psychological Ass’n, Right to Remain Silent Not Understood by 
Many Suspects: Confusion About Constitutional Rights Can Lead to Self-Incrimination, 
Psychologist Reports (Aug. 5, 2011), http://www.apa.org/news/press/releases/2011/08/remain-
silent.aspx [https://perma.cc/Y99T-P3PL] (“The public, police and sometimes courts wrongly 
believe that people in custody understand their rights.”).  
154. See Lichtenberg, supra note 127, at 374. 
155. Id. 
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after drivers received a Robinette warning.
156
 Sadly for those who hoped 
that knowledge of one’s rights would empower the public, “[r]esearch 
suggests that verbal warnings do not have any substantial impact on 
consent or confessions.”157 
Unfortunately, “observers outside of the situation systematically 
overestimate the extent to which citizens in police encounters feel free to 
refuse” consent.158 Further information is needed to establish how often 
individuals will actually feel comfortable declining to interact with 
officers. The Kessler study, discussed immediately below, contributes to 
that conversation. 
D. Kessler’s Study Indicates People Do Not Feel Comfortable 
Disregarding Police Questions 
A 2009 study by David Kessler
159
 served as a primary inspiration for 
this Comment (“the Kessler study”). Kessler collected data from a 
sample of commuting adults to determine how free they would feel to 
ignore a police officer who asked them questions on a sidewalk or while 
riding a bus.
160
 He used a one-page questionnaire
161
 “distributed in four 
locations in Boston on four different dates . . . .”162 Kessler’s surveyors 
spoke with 406 individuals with an overall survey response rate of 36.6 
percent.
163
 His sample over-represented people under age twenty-five 
and under-represented non-White persons.
164
 Kessler describes surveyor 
behavior as follows: 
The surveyors were trained to use a standard prompt to ask 
people if they wanted to participate and a standard response to 
explain what the survey was about if people asked. Surveyors 
were trained to let the respondents circle or write their own 
answers; surveyors were to provide help only by saying that 
“there are no right answers” and that the respondent should 
“select whatever answer he thought made the most sense to 
                                                     
156. Id. at 367. 
157. Id. at 374. 
158. Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion, 2002 SUP. 
CT. REV. 153, 156 (2002).  
159. See Kessler, supra note 23, at 70. 
160. Id. at 68. Eight Harvard Law School students conducted the surveys; half of the students 
were female and all but one White. Id. 
161. See infra Appendix A. 
162. See Kessler, supra note 23, at 68. 
163. Id. at 73. 
164. Id. at 73–74. 
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him.” Finally, surveyors were trained to track the number of 
people who declined to complete a survey or who did not 
respond in any way when asked, but they did not track the age, 
race, or gender of those who declined. Surveyors were warned to 
avoid favoring any particular demographic. Instead, they were 
asked simply to talk to everyone in the area, including both 
individuals and groups of people.
165
 
Kessler acknowledges potential biases, including the possibility that 
individual attitudes in the Boston area do not represent national attitudes 
as a whole.
166
 Kessler also notes that the type of people who stop in 
public, talk to a surveyor, and fill out a questionnaire may “be the type 
of people who generally feel more compelled to do what other people 
ask them to do.”167 Kessler minimizes these concerns, however, by 
claiming “it is difficult to imagine that the situational forces surrounding 
a law student’s request to complete a survey are similar enough to a 
police officer’s request to answer questions that the sample, consisting 
of people who are willing to stop for the law student, would be 
significantly skewed.”168 
Another potential problem that Kessler does not discuss in his 
paper
169
 involves the use of mean (average) values. Although Kessler’s 
questions one and two (regarding comfort refusing to interact with the 
police on a sidewalk and comfort refusing to interact with the police on a 
bus, respectively) provide five response options
170
 laid out 
symmetrically in the styling of a Likert scale,
171
 the “somewhat free to 
leave or say no”172 third option may have been insufficiently clear to 
respondents, calling into question whether respondents perceived the 
spacing between the answer options as a truly even interval. Without an 
even interval between response options, responses are best treated as 
                                                     
165. Id. at 68.  
166. Id. at 72. 
167. Id. 
168. Id. 
169. See generally id. 
170. For the reproduction of Kessler’s questions, see infra Appendix A. 
171. A Likert scale is made up of a series of questions with response options often ranging from 
one to five. See Christian Vanek, Likert Scale—What Is It? When to Use It? How to Analyze It?, 
SURVEYGIZMO (Apr. 24, 2012), https://www.surveygizmo.com/survey-blog/likert-scale-what-is-it-
how-to-analyze-it-and-when-to-use-it/ [https://perma.cc/8RQE-8M2V].  
172. See the reproduction of Kessler’s questions infra Appendix A. 
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ordinal
173
 data, and hence discussing mean values is a non-preferred 
method of reporting and analysis.
174
 Furthermore, while Kessler 
considers the response options for his third question
175
 as ordered from 
highest to lowest obligation,
176
 some readers may view the response 
categories as not on the same spectrum of rights versus obligations, and 
thus these responses may not be properly ordinal. In light of these 
concerns and the degree to which the Washington questions replicate the 
Kessler questions, means will not be calculated or compared for the 
Washington study discussed below.
177
 
The Kessler study finds that the vast majority of respondents 
expressed at least some discomfort with ignoring a police officer’s 
questions: “[a]s the distribution of responses in both 
scenarios . . . shows, about half of the sample selected [option one] or 
[option two], and almost 80% selected [option three] or less.”178 Because 
Kessler’s results so clearly indicate respondents’ discomfort with 
refusing police questions, Kessler suggests alternatives to the United 
States Supreme Court’s reasonable person standard, such as adopting a 
more fact-specific or narrowly tailored reasonable person standard, or, 
alternatively, modifying the perspective from which courts consider 
reasonableness (e.g., analyzing the scenario from the perspective of a 
model citizen or model police officer).
179
 Both approaches are discussed 
further below.
180
 
IV. NEWLY GATHERED DATA SUGGEST MORE COMFORT 
REFUSING THE POLICE THAN FOUND IN KESSLER’S 
STUDY 
The current project focuses on the following goals: generate a small 
batch of data; compare that data with the Kessler study;
181
 and suggest 
                                                     
173. What Is the Difference Between Categorical, Ordinal and Interval Variables?, UCLA INST. 
FOR DIGITAL RES. AND EDUC. (Jan. 14, 2006), http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/mult_pkg/ 
whatstat/nominal_ordinal_interval.htm [https://perma.cc/4MRL-3CYU]. 
174. Jim Frost, Choosing Between a Nonparametric Test and a Parametric Test, THE MINITAB 
BLOG (Feb. 19, 2015), http://blog.minitab.com/blog/adventures-in-statistics/choosing-between-a-
nonparametric-test-and-a-parametric-test [https://perma.cc/TQF5-6R4E]. 
175. See infra Appendix A. 
176. Kessler, supra note 23, at 70. 
177. See infra Part IV.  
178. Kessler, supra note 23, at 75. 
179. Id. at 84–85. 
180. See infra Part VI. 
181. See generally Kessler, supra note 23. 
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hypotheses worth testing with future, more sophisticated sampling. 
Time, funding, and personnel were limited. To that end, the researcher
182
 
attached questions to a statewide telephone poll conducted by 
professionally trained interviewers
183
 collecting responses from a 
random sample of Washington voters. The researcher then took those 
same questions and personally collected responses from a small, targeted 
sample: clients at a Seattle addiction recovery center.
184
 The random 
sample of Washington voters produced different responses than the 
targeted sample of persons recovering from addictions.
185
 Neither set of 
responses mirrors the results from the Kessler study.
186
 Below, the 
Comment first lays out findings from the telephone poll and the recovery 
center survey, then compares those findings with the Kessler study. 
A. A Telephone Survey of Washington Voters Indicates More 
Boldness than Seen from the Kessler Study Respondents 
Most respondents in the present study reported comfort ignoring the 
police. The sample over-represented older, White members of the 
overall population,
187
 but non-White respondents’ answers did not seem 
to markedly differ from White respondents’ answers. More people than 
expected (27% of all respondents and 38% of respondents making more 
than $100,000 per year) claimed to have been stopped by police for 
reasons other than traffic stops.
188
 
Answers to question one, regarding refusing to answer questions 
when stopped on the sidewalk, as well as question two, regarding 
refusing to answer questions while on a bus, both produced more 
responses indicating comfort with ignoring the police when compared to 
the 2009 Kessler study.
189
 Washington voters’ comfort refusing the 
police did not always align with their sense of obligations and rights. 
Respondents expressed relative comfort talking with police, but many 
                                                     
182. References to “the researcher” throughout this paper refer to the author. 
183. See Methods & Services, ELWAY RESEARCH, INC., http://www.elwayresearch.com/ 
services.html [https://perma.cc/SBX8-MEXT]. 
184. Many thanks to the staff and members at Seattle’s Recovery Café. For more information on 
that organization, see RECOVERY CAFÉ, https://recoverycafe.org/ [https://perma.cc/J56D-V5ZQ]. 
185. See infra Part V. 
186. Compare supra section III.D, with infra Part V. See generally Kessler, supra note 23. 
187. For information regarding voter survey methodology, see infra Appendix C. 
188. See infra Appendix B. Data on file with author. 
189. See infra section V.A. Data on file with author. 
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reported believing they have at least some obligation to interact or else 
face unfortunate consequences.
190
 
B. The Survey of Seattle-Based Recovery Center Clients Provided 
Further Surprises, Tracking the Kessler Study in Some Respects 
but Adding a Qualitative Twist 
Unlike the wide, random sample pursued above, the survey of 
recovery center clients took the same questions and solicited responses 
from a purposive
191
 group of individuals who have undergone extreme 
experiences and taken steps to seek stability. The researcher spoke with 
this group “in order to develop a richer, more in-depth understanding” of 
how an outlier case might respond to police.
192
 Some respondent clients 
face issues such as homelessness, substance abuse, and mental illness,
193
 
and the researcher suspected these challenges may affect this 
subpopulation’s perceptions of police and freedom to leave a 
conversation. Recovery program membership ensured that respondents 
could answer in a safe, sober space, allowing maximum ability to 
participate.
194
 
This particular center served as a convenient place to sample one 
cluster of a target population; using volunteer respondents added an 
additional layer of convenience rather than randomness.
195
 Future studies 
may aim for a broader, more random set of participants from within this 
target group. 
                                                     
190. See infra section V.A. Data on file with author. 
191. For an explanation of selecting a non-probability sample based on population characteristics 
and study purpose, see Ashley Crossman, Understanding Purposive Sampling: An Overview of the 
Method and Its Applications, ABOUT.COM (May 13, 2016), http://sociology.about.com/od/Types-of-
Samples/a/Purposive-Sample.htm [https://perma.cc/W289-5KNZ] (discussing variants of purposive 
group sampling).  
192. D. Cohen & B. Crabtree, Extreme or Deviant Cases, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUNDATION 
(July 2006), http://www.qualres.org/HomeExtr-3808.html [https://perma.cc/TK9C-KKYL].  
193. See About, RECOVERY CAFÉ, https://recoverycafe.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/TMN8-
2LGD]. 
194. Id. 
195. See Ashley Crossman, Convenience Sample: A Brief Overview of the Sampling Technique, 
ABOUT.COM (June 10, 2016), http://sociology.about.com/od/Types-of-Samples/a/Convenience-
Sample.htm [https://perma.cc/3G8B-TSC6].  
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1. The Recovery Center Survey Drew from a Sample Demographically 
Different from the Washington Voter Survey and Allowed for 
Unexpected Qualitative Elements 
The recovery center survey output exceeded that intended based on 
the planned methodology.
196
 This raised potential analysis challenges 
and questions for future research.
197
 This section will discuss respondent 
demographics and then address the unique character of particular 
responses. 
The recovery center survey sampled a more demographically diverse 
group than did the Washington voter survey.
198
 Of the recovery center 
respondents, 53% indicated male gender and 60% indicated Caucasian 
race.
199
 Other races included African American (10%), Asian (7.5%), 
and Mixed Race (7.5%). A high percentage (75%) of respondents 
indicated experiencing a stop other than a traffic stop.
200
 
The small group survey environment increased the likelihood that 
respondents would talk with each other or with the researcher.
201
 Many 
respondents verbally reported learning disabilities, and at least one 
respondent reported blindness.
202
 The researcher opted to avoid the 
chance of bias from not including these perspectives rather than avoiding 
the potential bias from explaining the words on the survey form or 
allowing a respondent’s friend to read the form aloud.203 Some of the 
respondents made written or verbal comments.
204
 Anecdotes about 
relevant life experiences stood out in the moment, alerting the researcher 
                                                     
196. See infra Appendix D. 
197. Qualitative research interactions commonly involve such evolution. See CHAVA 
FRANKFORT-NACHMIAS & DAVID NACHMIAS, RESEARCH METHODS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 292 
(5th ed. 1996) (“Data analysis in qualitative field research is an ongoing process . . . . As the 
research progresses, some hypotheses are discarded, others are refined, and still others are 
formulated.”). 
198. See supra section IV.A.  
199. See infra Appendix B. Data on file with author. 
200. Id. 
201. See infra Appendix D. 
202. See infra section IV.B.2. 
203. Communication barriers reduce response rates. See Ann Bowling, Mode of Questionnaire 
Administration Can Have Serious Effects on Data Quality, 27 OXFORD J. PUB. HEALTH 281, 281–
91 (2005), http://jpubhealth.oxfordjournals.org/content/27/3/281.full [https://perma.cc/Q88J-NNF8] 
(“The lower the response rate to a study, the greater the danger that the responders may differ from 
non-respondents in their characteristics, which affects the precision (reliability) of the survey’s 
population estimates, resulting in study bias, and weakening the external validity (generalizability) 
of the survey results.”). 
204. See infra section IV.B.2. 
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to capture this unsolicited qualitative data as accurately and as soon as 
possible.
205
 
Due to the differences in collection methods and sample size, the 
telephone survey and the recovery center survey results cannot be 
combined and, in some respects, may be difficult to compare.
206
 
Although certain members of the population are statistically more likely 
than others to vote,
207
 the telephone survey of Washington voters 
nonetheless featured a larger and more random sample than the recovery 
center survey.
208
 Yet the information communicated by the addiction 
center respondents was richer and thus potentially more illuminating 
than that gathered during the more standardized telephone survey 
process.
209
 During the recovery center survey, the researcher acquired 
not only responses, but also some reasons behind those responses.
210
 
In Part V, this Comment explains any indications that the Kessler 
study, the telephone survey, and the recovery center survey point in 
similar directions. It also discusses how the results generally compare. 
That discussion, and the recommendations in Part IV, draws in part upon 
unsolicited comments from recovery center survey respondents, the 
topic discussed immediately below.
211
 
                                                     
205. See FRANKFORT-NACHMIAS & NACHMIAS, supra note 197, at 291–92 (“When researchers 
cannot overtly document observations, they must use devices to help them remember events as they 
occurred so they can be fully documented at the earliest possible opportunity.”). 
206. While it is possible that the Wednesday and Friday experiences differ enough that the data 
could be considered separately, no evidence indicates categorically different attendees on one day 
versus the other. Given the relatively small sample size and the known presence of multiple clients 
present on both days, the researcher has opted to present combined information from Wednesday 
and Friday.  
207. Voter eligibility, voter registration, and voter turnout differ; overall, Whites tend to vote at a 
higher rate than many other groups. See Voter Registration Data, WASH. SECRETARY OF STATE 
(Jan. 31, 2016), http://www.sos.wa.gov/elections/vrdb/vrdbfaq.aspx [https://perma.cc/24HQ-
FQTW] (“Approximately 80% of the state’s voting eligible population is registered to vote, 
according to the statistics gathered by Michael P. McDonald’s United States Elections Project in 
2014.”); Jens Manuel Krogstad, 2016 Electorate Will Be the Most Diverse in U.S. History, PEW 
RESEARCH CTR. (Feb. 3, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/02/03/2016-electorate-
will-be-the-most-diverse-in-u-s-history/ [https://perma.cc/65AC-ZXSY] (“In the 2012 presidential 
election, 64% of non-Hispanic white eligible voters cast ballots, as did 67% of black eligible voters. 
By comparison, the voter turnout rate was 48% among Hispanics and 47% among Asians.”).  
208. Compare infra Appendix C, with infra Appendix D. Data on file with author. 
209. Compare infra section V.A, with infra section IV.B.2. 
210. See infra section IV.B.2. 
211. As an aside, the extra information revealed during the recovery center conversations may 
inform the best way to structure future research efforts. For example, a series of semi-structured 
interviews or focus groups discussing the reasonable person standard would allow for follow-up 
questions and exploration of what motivates attitudes, perhaps contributing more or different 
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2. Recovery Center Respondent Comments Show Mixed Feelings 
Regarding Empowerment and Trust When Interacting with 
Authority Figures 
A few participants shared unsolicited written comments on their 
survey response forms.
212
 The written comments provided some limited 
information but were less revealing than verbal discussions. The written 
comments split along confidence lines. For example, in the section 
relating to sidewalk stops,
213
 one participant wrote, “I have a schedule to 
keep.”214 Other participants expressed more deference to or distrust of 
police or other authority, including the following: (1) “No rights on a 
metro bus;”215 (2) “I was arrested for refusing to talk to an officer 
responding to a 911 call to my home;”216 and (3) “‘You have a legal 
right to ignore the officer, but he may assume you are guilty of 
wrongdoing if you do’ is my true answer, but ‘You have the legal right 
to refuse to talk with the officer with no consequence to yourself’ is how 
it should be.”217 
Some participants also opted to make verbal comments, engaging in 
conversation with the researcher or making comments while exiting.
218
 
The researcher attempted to preserve the commenter’s phrasing as 
accurately as possible.
219
 Verbal comments fell along a spectrum from 
empowerment to fear. 
The empowerment comments included the following: (1) “I’m blind. 
If someone asks me a question I don’t want to answer, I just don’t say 
anything. A lot of times they assume I’m deaf too and leave me 
alone,”220 (2) “I believe I have a moral duty to help police in most 
                                                     
information than another round of randomized surveys. For further discussion, see infra Parts V and 
VI. 
212. See supra section IV.B.1; infra Appendix D. 
213. See infra Appendix B. Data on file with author. 
214. Personal communications with recovery center survey respondents, by handwritten 
comments on paper forms, in Seattle, WA (Oct. 28, 2015) (on file with author). 
215. Id. 
216. Id. 
217. Id. 
218. See supra section IV.B.1; infra Appendix D. 
219. Recording actual statements as nearly as possible, rather than attempting to record summary 
impressions, minimizes “cultural” phrases that could include a researcher’s biases. See CAROLYN 
FRANK, ETHNOGRAPHIC EYES 6–7 (1999). 
220. Personal communications with recovery center survey respondent, by verbal comment, in 
Seattle, WA (Oct. 28, 2015). 
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situations but not a legal duty,”221 (3) “No one has a right to interrupt me 
if I’m on my way somewhere important, not even the police. I just keep 
walking,”222 and (4) “Am I being detained? I just keep asking that until I 
get a straight answer. If I’m not being detained, they have to let me 
go.”223 
Comments about subordination by authority figures included the 
following: (1) “I refuse to ride transit. I don’t care how many miles I 
have to walk. I’ve got no rights once I step onto a bus,”224 and (2) “It’s 
all fine and good to talk about my legal right to not cooperate. That 
won’t help me when I’m lying on the sidewalk with a police boot on my 
head.”225 
The fearful comments included the following: (1) “With all the news 
on TV about police shooting people, especially Black people, I wouldn’t 
feel safe just walking away,”226 and (2) “I have disabilities, but they’re 
not obvious to someone walking down the street. Being handcuffed 
might break my wrists, and being pushed to the ground might break my 
hip. If I break my hip again, the doctor says I’ll be stuck in a wheelchair 
probably for life. I’m terrified of the police. They don’t understand how 
strong they are and how easily they could hurt me. If they stop me, I’ll 
tell them whatever they want to know.”227 
The last comment above raises a poignant issue regarding disability 
protections.
228
 Not all disabilities necessarily lead to a sense of 
powerlessness—see the first comment in the “empowerment” batch 
above—but certain conditions may make “freedom to leave” a farce. 
Just as knowing that civil tort suits exist does not necessarily reduce fear 
during an assault,
229
 the ability to sue the police for a civil rights 
violation after the fact
230
 (assuming one even learns of the option) may 
not prevent a person with disabilities from feeling seized and vulnerable 
during a police interaction. 
                                                     
221. Id. 
222. Id. 
223. Id. 
224. Id. 
225. Id. 
226. Id. 
227. Id. 
228. See supra section II.A. 
229. Indeed, without reasonable apprehension of bodily harm at the moment of the alleged 
assault, a plaintiff cannot prevail when bringing a civil assault suit. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 21 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).  
230. See Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 601 (1989).  
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As discussed earlier, legal standard accommodations for those with 
disabilities already exist.
231
 Adjusting the seizure standard in response to 
disabilities or other vulnerabilities receives more attention below.
232
 
V. THE KESSLER, WASHINGTON VOTER, AND RECOVERY 
CENTER SURVEYS SHOW DIVERGING TRENDS BUT 
INDICATE A POSSIBLE GENDER DIFFERENCE 
The overall results of the Kessler, Washington voter, and recovery 
center surveys point in different directions; the Kessler study shows 
discomfort interacting with the police whereas the newer surveys 
indicate higher comfort levels. The Washington voter survey shows high 
comfort levels from respondents of both genders.
233
 The Kessler study 
and the recovery center survey results, however, indicate a possible 
difference between the willingness of women and men to refuse police 
interactions.
234
 
A Overall Responses from the Kessler Study, the Telephone Survey, 
and Recovery Center Survey Diverge 
The Kessler study responses, discussed in greater detail below, 
indicate discomfort interacting with the police.
235
 Responses from the 
Washington voter telephone survey indicate a higher comfort level and 
willingness to terminate interactions with police.
236
 The recovery center 
survey outcome is more opaque, with respondents divided.
237
 
First, the Kessler study responses, below, show a distribution clearly 
indicating discomfort with refusing to respond to police questions on a 
sidewalk (question one) or on a bus (question two).
238
 
                                                     
231. See supra section II.A.  
232. See infra section VI.B.1.  
233. See infra Figure 5. 
234. See infra Figures 4, 6. 
235. See infra Figure 1. 
236. See infra Figure 2. 
237. See infra Figure 3. 
238. Kessler, supra note 23, at 74–75.  
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Figure 1: 
Kessler’s Distribution of Responses to Questions 1 and 2 
 
Next, the Washington telephone survey of voters suggests the 
opposite result—but one could argue whether respondents selecting 
option three should be treated as uncomfortable, neutral, or 
comfortable.239 Kessler’s survey form labeled option three as 
“somewhat free to leave or say no” and treated this wording as 
indicating some level of discomfort,
240
 whereas this researcher believes 
option three may indicate neutrality or perhaps a positive lean.
241
 In any 
case, those choosing options four and five in the Washington telephone 
survey outnumber those choosing options one and two.
242
 
 
                                                     
239. See supra section III.D. 
240. See Kessler, supra note 23, at 75. 
241. For a more detailed discussion of issues with the wording in question three, including the 
“somewhat free to leave” phrasing, see supra section III.D. 
242. See infra Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: 
Washington Telephone Survey:  
Responses to Questions 1 and 2 
 
 
Finally, the survey of addiction recovery center patrons produced a 
bifurcated set of responses.
243
 Given the small number of respondents 
selecting option four, however, the answers weigh more toward 
indicating discomfort with refusing to respond to police questions.
244
 
                                                     
243. See infra Figure 3. 
244. Id. 
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Figure 3: 
Addiction Recovery Center Patron Survey:  
Responses to Questions 1 and 2 
 
 
B. Women May Feel Less Comfortable Refusing the Police than  
Do Men 
Kessler’s study provides some evidence that women may feel less 
comfortable refusing to interact with police than men typically feel.
245
 
The Washington voter survey shows the opposite result.
246
 The recovery 
center survey responses, however, follow the Kessler pattern.
247
 
Kessler’s study did not produce results supporting or refuting the idea 
that racial minorities might feel less comfortable refusing the police, but 
Kessler did notice a pattern related to respondents’ status as young or 
female.
248
 He postulated this may relate to vulnerability, stating that the 
“coercive pressure of police encounters”249 led to the result that “groups 
generally expected to feel especially vulnerable—the young and 
women—would in fact feel less free to leave in the face of police 
authority.”250 
                                                     
245. See infra Figure 4. 
246. See infra Figure 5. 
247. See infra Figure 6. 
248. Kessler, supra note 23, at 75–76. 
249. Id. at 77. 
250. Id. 
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Figure 4 
Kessler Comparison of Male and Female  
Responses to Question 1
251
 
 
 
The Washington telephone survey of voters did not indicate that 
women experience more discomfort refusing the police than do men.
252
 
If anything, the telephone survey results indicate a slightly higher 
likelihood that women would choose response five, “Completely free to 
leave or say no,”253 although the difference is not statistically 
significant.
254
 
 
                                                     
251. Due to space concerns, this Comment compares answers to question one across the three 
surveys. Comparing the answers to question two across the three surveys strongly mirrors the 
comparison between question one answers. 
252. See infra Figure 5. 
253. See infra Appendix B. 
254. Compare this with the result from women in the recovery center survey. See infra note 255. 
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Figure 5: 
Washington Voters, by Sex,  
Responses to Question 1, Sidewalk Scenario 
 
 
In contrast, the addiction recovery center survey showed male respondents 
significantly more likely to indicate comfort refusing the police.
255
 
Figure 6: 
Addiction Recovery Survey, by Sex, Question 1, Sidewalk Scenario 
 
 
 
                                                     
255. The proportion of female respondents selecting responses four or five differed from the 
portion of male respondents selecting responses four or five; the result was statistically significant, 
with a p-value of less than 5%. 
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Rather than verifying Kessler’s 2009 findings,256 the new data sets 
instead prompt further questions, answerable only with more extensive 
research. For example, the field would benefit from a study with a 
sample of minority respondents large enough to draw meaningful 
conclusions.
257
 Questions also remain as to whether the impetuousness 
or fragility of youth prevails during police interactions.
258
 Finally, the 
recovery center survey process highlighted unexpected information 
regarding those with disabilities, providing some conflicting information 
but triggering troubling possibilities.
259
 Further investigation is 
warranted. A more extensive discussion of future research possibilities 
follows. 
VI. NEXT STEPS: EFFECTIVELY UPDATING THE REASONABLE 
PERSON STANDARD REQUIRES GIVING JUDGES ACCESS 
TO MORE SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH, BUT SWITCHING 
TO A REASONABLE OFFICER STANDARD MAY 
ACCOMPLISH MORE 
When determining the standard for when officers have seized a 
civilian, courts must balance the goals of protecting individual liberties 
and allowing officers to efficiently fight crime.
260
 The seizure standard 
should account for real-world circumstances, including demonstrated 
patterns of laypersons acquiescing to authority figures.
261
 Unfortunately, 
acquiring new data regarding civilians’ attitudes about police 
interactions poses difficult challenges for researchers.
262
 To the extent 
that the courts wish to update the reasonable person “free-to-leave” 
standard to increase fairness for vulnerable populations, judges should 
have the opportunity to review additional psychological and social 
science research. Switching the seizure standard to exclusively focus on 
officer actions, however, may produce superior results. 
                                                     
256. Compare section III.D, with Part V. 
257. See Kessler, supra note 23, at 73. 
258. See infra section VI.A. 
259. See supra section IV.B.2. 
260. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 565–66 (1980) (plurality opinion). 
261. See Kessler, supra note 23, at 82–83.  
262. See supra Parts IV, V. 
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A. If Judges Wish to Continue with the Existing Reasonable Person 
Standard, They Should Have the Opportunity to Review More 
Social Science Research, Particularly Focusing on Young 
Minorities and Disabled Persons 
This researcher’s studies, discussed above, did not provide clear 
answers regarding youth or racial minorities’ opinions.263 Non-White 
individuals under age thirty-five require further study.
264
 Studies thus far 
have not indicated a difference in comfort refusing the police based on 
race, but those efforts have not surveyed many persons of color, 
particularly young persons of color.
265
 Given well-publicized problems 
with police engagement within minority communities,
266
 one may 
continue to hypothesize that a young Black man or woman will feel 
different about a police stop than an older White man. 
Finding a robust sample of a young population is challenging.
267
 High 
schools contain large groups of minors, but interacting with minors 
triggers more stringent human research restrictions.
268
 Community 
college students or four-year college students do not represent an 
                                                     
263. See supra sections IV.A, IV.B. 
264. See Kessler, supra note 23, at 73 (“It will not be possible to determine the effects of [White 
respondent] selection bias until subsequent research explores similar questions in other 
populations.”). 
265. Some early experiments did not even record racial identifiers. See, e.g., MILGRAM, supra 
note 125, at 14 (drawing volunteers from the general population of New Haven, seeking a diversity 
in “class backgrounds” but failing to even note race or ethnicity of participants). According to the 
1960 United States Census, New Haven’s population was 90.1% Caucasian. Campbell Gibson & 
Kay Jung, Historical Census Statistics on Population Totals by Race, 1790 to 1990, and by 
Hispanic Origin, 1970 to 1990, for Large Cities and Other Urban Places in the United States 39 
tbl.7 (U.S. Census Bureau Population Div., Working Paper No. 76, Feb. 2005), 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0076/CTtab.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
J66A-6XJA]. For a more recent experiment that did not shed light on racial differences, see Alisa 
M. Smith et al., Testing Judicial Assumptions of the “Consensual” Encounter: An Experimental 
Study, 14 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 285, 302–03 (2013) (finding no difference between respondents of 
varying races, but surveying only fourteen persons who self-identified as a race other than 
Caucasian). 
266. See, e.g., Rebecca Kaplan, How Do Police Improve Relations with Minority Communities?, 
CBS NEWS (Dec. 7, 2014), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/are-police-doing-enough-to-improve-
relations-with-minority-communities/ [https://perma.cc/L4WY-XXFH]. 
267. Paul R. Amato, Life-Span Adjustment of Children to Their Parents’ Divorce, 4 CHILD. & 
DIVORCE 143, 144 (1994), http://futureofchildren.org/publications/journals/article/index.xml? 
journalid=63&articleid=415&sectionid=2839 [https://perma.cc/QW9D-QY6S] (“Unfortunately, 
these types of samples [(random samples of children)] are also the most difficult and expensive to 
obtain.”).  
268. See, e.g., Requirements for Permission by Parents or Guardians and for Assent by Children, 
45 C.F.R. § 46.408 (2009), http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulations-and-policy/regulations/45-cfr-
46/index.html#46.408 [https://perma.cc/FQ2Y-45EH].  
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unbiased sample of the total population,
269
 and attempting to focus on 
campus subsets, such as race-themed organizations, can lead to further 
selection bias.
270
 
Despite these complications, shedding even partial light on the subject 
could allow more-fully-informed future decision-making.
271
 Perhaps a 
paper analyzing two additional groups would add more than any one 
sample could. First, researchers could collect responses from a large 
sample of community college students, preferably statewide.
272
 Although 
students may not have the same life experiences as non-students, police 
may more likely profile or stereotype young people of color during 
“social” stops,273 and thus compiling any mass of youth responses may 
yield useful insights despite potential sample bias. Next, an organization 
such as the local or statewide NAACP may allow a researcher to survey 
registered members.
274
 Such an effort may have an unpredictable 
response rate, but mailing or emailing a sufficiently large set of surveys 
or using weighting adjustments would at least begin painting a picture of 
                                                     
269. See WHO ATTENDS COMMUNITY COLLEGE?: COMMUNITY COLLEGE STUDENTS COME FROM 
A BROAD RANGE OF BACKGROUNDS, DATA POINTS, AM. ASS’N OF CMTY. COLLS. (Apr. 2015), 
http://www.aacc.nche.edu/Publications/datapoints/Documents/WhoAttendsCC_1_MD.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3PR7-JC6N] (discussing that many community college students are 
“nontraditional,” including single parents and students with disabilities); Bethany Brookshire, 
Psychology Is WEIRD: Western College Students Are Not the Best Representatives of Human 
Emotion, Behavior, and Sexuality, SLATE (May 8, 2013), http://www.slate.com/articles/health 
_and_science/science/2013/05/weird_psychology_social_science_researchers_rely_too_much_on_
western_college.html [https://perma.cc/7YW4-QP8X] (noting that Western college students differ 
from the global population, that people with different socioeconomic backgrounds have different 
perceptions of the world around them, and that college students may differ in their responses to 
social punishment). 
270. See Amato, supra note 267, at 144 (“Researchers obtain convenience samples of children or 
adults through community organizations (such as single-parent support groups) or other local 
sources. Convenience samples are relatively easy and inexpensive to obtain, but people in these 
groups may be atypical in unknown ways.” (emphasis in original)).  
271. See Oral Argument at 44, Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249 (2007) (No. 06-8120) (quoted 
in Kessler, supra note 23, at 61 n.60). 
272. For a discussion of approaches to sampling community college students, see Richard A. 
Rasor & James E. Barr, Survey Sampling of Community College Students: For Better or for Worse, 
ANN. CONF. OF THE RES. & PLAN. GRP. FOR CAL. CMTY. COLLS. (1998), 
http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED416932.pdf [https://perma.cc/M752-927E].  
273. See Ranjana Natarajan, Racial Profiling Has Destroyed Public Trust in Police. Cops Are 
Exploiting Our Weak Laws Against It, WASH. POST (Dec. 15, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2014/12/15/racial-profiling-has-destroyed-
public-trust-in-police-cops-are-exploiting-our-weak-laws-against-it/ [https://perma.cc/37C2-X6R3]. 
274. Some branches of the NAACP survey members. See, e.g., SGV NAACP Membership 
Information Survey, SAN GABRIEL VALLEY NAACP BRANCH #1066 (2016), 
http://www.sgvnaacp.org/#!take-our-survey/g36nm [https://perma.cc/P79D-24GH].  
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this subgroup’s experiences.275 Results from either a youth survey—
preferably one with a substantial number of minority respondents—or an 
NAACP survey—preferably one with a substantial number of youth 
respondents—could be enlightening, and in the event that both sets of 
responses point toward the same conclusion, the judiciary may value 
having fresh data to inform an updated standard.
276
 
Research regarding effects on persons with disabilities may prove 
even more difficult than the racial or youth sampling issues discussed 
above. First, the researcher would need to designate which disability 
categories merited investigation; as one potential starting point, the 
Social Security Administration lists fourteen disability categories, each 
with specific conditions enumerated.
277
 If a researcher wished to further 
narrow the field, perhaps he or she could start with samples targeting the 
two conditions (blindness and likely some variant of brittle bones, either 
due to osteoporosis or osteogenesis imperfecta) discussed in the 
recovery center survey comments.
278
 The researcher could then assess 
whether a significant portion of respondents in the target sample report 
discomfort refusing the police.
279
 Such deeper investigation would 
elucidate whether the recovery center qualitative responses uncovered an 
important factor or merely a coincidence. 
As discussed above,
280
 researchers may also pursue interviews and 
focus groups, as they may prove more fruitful than the basic survey 
approach. These face-to-face interactions allow the researcher to ask not 
only whether an individual would feel comfortable refusing to interact 
with police, but why the person feels that way and what might change 
the person’s reaction.281 
                                                     
275. For a discussion of one method for using weighting to adjust for low survey response rates, 
see Eric L. Dey, Working with Low Survey Response Rates: The Efficacy of Weighting Adjustments, 
38 RES. IN HIGHER EDUC. 215, 215–27 (1997), https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/40196243.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2017). 
276. See Monahan & Walker, supra note 21. 
277. See Disability Evaluation Under Social Security: Listing of Impairments - Adult Listings 
(Part A), SOCIAL SECURITY, https://www.ssa.gov/disability/professionals/bluebook/AdultListings. 
htm [https://perma.cc/ENH5-33J9]; Disability Evaluation Under Social Security: Part III - Listing 
of Impairments, SOCIAL SECURITY, https://www.ssa.gov/disability/professionals/ bluebook/listing-
impairments.htm [https://perma.cc/S427-VX7X] (implying that many unlisted debilitating 
conditions may exist, as the Social Security Administration list focuses on “impairments [that] are 
permanent or expected to result in death, or the listing includes a specific statement of duration”).  
278. See supra section IV.B.2. 
279. For a discussion of purposive sampling and its merits, see Crossman, supra note 191. 
280. See supra section IV.B.1.  
281. See D. Cohen & B. Crabtree, Focus Groups, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUNDATION (July 
2006), http://www.qualres.org/HomeFocu-3647.html [https://perma.cc/QDJ8-TKA4] (noting that 
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B. The Reasonable Person Standard Could Be Updated to More 
Accurately Account for Vulnerabilities, but Switching to an 
Emphasis on Officer Conduct Would Produce Better Outcomes 
This Comment has reviewed previous studies concerning civilian 
response to authority
282
 and added new data regarding comfort levels 
when interacting with police.
283
 Arguments exist for updating the 
existing reasonable person standard to better account for circumstances 
faced by certain vulnerable members within the civilian population.
284
 
The courts, however, may be more likely to shape actual behavior by 
focusing on officer conduct rather than the supposedly objective notions 
of civilian comfort levels.
285
 
1. Adding Nuance to the Existing Reasonable Person Standard Would 
More Accurately Account for Defendants’ Vulnerabilities 
Modifying the reasonable person standard by adding exceptions for 
categories of people rather than engaging in individual-by-individual 
protections would maintain some semblance of objectivity. It is also 
easier for social scientists to sample and thus produce research 
examining broad (e.g., “all men”) rather than narrow (e.g., “youth of 
Pacific-Islander origin”) categories.286 Unfortunately, a large category 
such as “the reasonable woman” may create more problems than it 
solves.
287
 
The combination of the Kessler study and the recovery center study 
indicates a potential argument for differentiating between the reasonable 
woman and the reasonable man,
288
 and some psychological research 
                                                     
focus groups often “explore a topic that does not lend itself to observational techniques (e.g. 
attitudes and decision-making)”); Surveys, Focus Groups and Interviews, QUEENSL. GOV’T (June 
28, 2016), https://www.business.qld.gov.au/business/starting/market-customer-research/researching 
-customers/surveys-focus-groups-interviews [https://perma.cc/C2LL-NMAD] (noting that open-
ended questions “tend to be better suited to qualitative research methods such as focus groups and 
interviews where you can ask follow-up questions to get more information”). 
282. See supra Part III. 
283. See supra Parts IV, V. 
284. See, e.g., supra section IV.B.2. 
285. See infra section VI.B.2. 
286. See Aaron Smith, Problems Associated with Surveying Small Demographic Groups, PEW 
RESEARCH CTR. (Aug. 12, 2010), http://www.pewinternet.org/2010/08/12/problems-associated-
with-surveying-small-demographic-groups/ [https://perma.cc/N6KG-5P3D] (discussing the extreme 
expense of collecting an adequately large set of responses from an ethnic subpopulation).  
287. See supra section II.C. 
288. See Kessler, supra note 23, at 84–85; supra section V.B. 
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indicates that women may be more prone to feel obligated to comply.
289
 
But substantial feminist legal scholarship raises criticisms of a 
“reasonable woman” standard.290 Kessler’s study notes that, while it may 
be “easier for law enforcement officials to know if their actions would 
make the reasonable person feel restrained than to know if their actions 
make the particular person with whom they are currently dealing feel 
that way,”291 courts may nonetheless consider adopting a “reasonable 
person of similar age” or “reasonable person of the same gender” 
standard.
292
 Kessler observes that, because the United States Supreme 
Court has previously discussed this more granular type of standard in the 
context of seizure,
293
 moving toward consistent implementation would 
not constitute a complete reversal of precedent. Courts also have made 
modifications to the reasonable person negligence standard—for 
example, holding a defendant to varying standards based on the 
defendant’s skill level294—and so a precedent for narrowing a reasonable 
person standard does exist.
295
 
When one considers the Washington results independent of the 
Kessler study, however, the evidence supporting a separate standard 
based on any easily identifiable exterior characteristics, even based on 
gender, appears weaker.
296
 The recovery center survey may have shown 
females indicating a greater hesitation to interact with the police, but it 
featured a small sample of a particular subset of the population.
297
 The 
broader Washington voter survey did not indicate that females are less 
comfortable refusing the police than are males.
298
 In light of the opaque 
evidence, if courts opt to modify the existing standard, they may do 
better focusing on a few particular vulnerabilities.
299
 
                                                     
289. Jesse-Justin Cuevas & Tonja Jacobi, The Hidden Psychology of Constitutional Criminal 
Procedure, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 2161, 2180 (2016) (“[A] woman would be more likely than a man 
to feel that she should be compliant and helpful, even if she does not want to submit to a search.”).  
290. See Cahn, supra note 97, at 1401. 
291. Kessler, supra note 23, at 84. 
292. Id. 
293. Id. (noting discussion of a “twenty-two year old . . . female” within United States v. 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 558 (1980) (plurality opinion)).  
294. See Charles R. Korsmo, Lost in Translation: Law, Economics, and Subjective Standards of 
Care in Negligence Law, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 285, 306, 319 (2013) (discussing the law and 
economics “standard model” and “inverse model” of injurer capacity). 
295. See supra section II.A. 
296. See supra section V.B. 
297. See supra section IV.B; infra Appendix D. 
298. See supra section V.B. 
299. See supra section IV.B.2. 
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The verbal comments from the recovery center survey
300
 may suggest 
that courts should expand jury instructions concerning disability or 
vulnerability. Even without definitive study results, courts have already 
established exceptions protecting individuals with disabilities;
301
 
clarifying that disabilities also deserve special consideration within 
seizure contexts would be a matter of tidying up existing verbiage. The 
courts could maintain the current standard but add a catch-all wrinkle for 
recognized disabilities or other special circumstances that place a 
defendant in a societally-recognized vulnerable position. Rather than, for 
example, changing the standard to assume that the average woman feels 
more vulnerable, the courts could continue to refer to the generic 
reasonable person but add a line item allowing the jury to account for 
individualities.
302
 Individualities may include disabilities, recent local 
violence toward certain minority groups, prejudice against youth, or 
whatever particularized vulnerabilities courts choose to consider.
303
 
As an example, one subset of women who may react differently to 
perceived threats include those experiencing or recovering from 
domestic violence.
304
 Women in this situation may have reason to be 
more fearful than the average woman in a variety of circumstances that 
ordinary individuals take for granted.
305
 Courts have dealt with this in 
certain assault or murder cases by allowing expert testimony to explain 
to jurors the intricacies of battered-woman syndrome and its effects on 
behavior.
306
 Juries can then evaluate the expert testimony and the totality 
of the circumstances to determine whether a female defendant’s choice 
seems reasonable in that instance. Scholars have been willing to express 
support for the “reasonable woman” standard within a domestic violence 
context in other areas of law, and thus using, for example, a “reasonable 
woman who has experienced domestic violence” standard in the seizure 
context may warrant further consideration.
307
 
Whether a defendant chose to argue membership in a group suffering 
                                                     
300. See supra section IV.B.2. 
301. See supra section II.A. 
302. See Kessler, supra note 23, at 85. 
303. See id.; supra section IV.B.2. 
304. See Cahn, supra note 97, at 1401. 
305. Jamie Rich, Compass Cards Compromise Women’s Safety and Enable Abusers, BATTERED 
WOMEN’S SUPPORT SERVS. (Jan. 29, 2016), http://www.bwss.org/compass-cards-compromise-
womens-safety-and-enable-abusers/ [https://perma.cc/636H-Y9C3].  
306. See generally Emily J. Sack, From the Right of Chastisement to the Criminalization of 
Domestic Violence: A Study in Resistance to Effective Policy Reform, 32 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 31 
(2009). 
307. See supra section II.C. 
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from an invisible disability, repeated exposure to race-based violence, a 
paranoia diagnosis, or any other particularity, courts could ask the jury 
to determine whether they believe the sincerity of the defendant’s claim 
or the strength of the group’s propensities. Some may insist that—
perhaps to avoid excessively fact-intensive inquiries or to reduce the 
incentive for fabrication—courts must “decline to take [the defendant’s] 
personal equation into account”;308 however, this level of fact-finding 
would be no more arduous than, for example, asking juries to determine 
the level of emotional involvement between a claimant and a victim in a 
negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) claim, a charge already 
commonly given.
309
 
Perception of personal vulnerability may seem insufficiently objective 
as a base standard, but it is no less measureable than the present 
“reasonableness” standard.310 When choosing between one 
immeasurable standard and another, courts should opt for the choice that 
maximizes fairness and broader justice.
311
 
2. Courts Should Provide Guidance to the “Reasonable Police 
Officer” Rather than the “Reasonable Seized Defendant” 
Determining what an “average” or “objective” suspect feels when 
interacting with the police involves multiple hurdles.
312
 Providing 
guidance designed to directly shape officer behavior, while also 
challenging, has a higher likelihood of producing results.
313
 In particular, 
courts often rely on the “reasonable officer” standard, first promulgated 
in Graham v. Connor.
314
 
Graham explains that officers must behave as an objectively 
reasonable officer would in light of the circumstances known in the 
                                                     
308. O. W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 108 (1909).  
309. See, e.g., Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372, 378 (N.J. 1994) (determining that a fiancée was 
emotionally close enough to deceased to recover for NIED claim as a spouse would and noting that 
courts can deal “with the realities, not simply the legalities, of relationships”). 
310. For a discussion of the difficulties in establishing a coherent “reasonable person” standard 
based on positive measurements, see Miller & Perry, supra note 108, at 328, 371. 
311. Fairness is such an important principle that, despite its arms-length distance from heat-of-
the-moment choices, increasing procedural fairness in the courtroom may reduce the number of 
crimes committed. See The Case for Procedural Justice: Fairness as a Crime Prevention Tool, 
CMTY. POLICING DISPATCH (Sept. 2013), http://cops.usdoj.gov/html/dispatch/09-2013/fairness 
_as_a_crime_prevention_tool.asp [https://perma.cc/G78H-VXAS].  
312. See Miller & Perry, supra note 108, at 328, 371. 
313. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (prompting concrete changes in police 
behavior when taking suspects into custody). 
314. 490 U.S. 386 (1989). 
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moment.
315
 In Graham, the factual record indicated
316
 that officers 
cuffed and placed facedown a man experiencing a diabetic reaction, then 
refused to allow him orange juice.
317
 The Court held that a proper 
analysis should focus on the higher standard of Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness rather than a due process inquiry to determine whether 
the particular officers had malicious intent.
318
 The Court did not consider 
whether the diabetic man behaved rationally, but rather whether the 
officers responded reasonably.
319
 
In J.D.B. v. North Carolina
320
, the Court similarly explored what the 
police should have known, rather than what the individual child likely 
felt, during in-custody questioning.
321
 The Court asserts that police 
cannot fail to notice and account for how a suspect’s age affects fear 
levels and the freedom to walk away.
322
 Justice Kennedy stated things 
plainly: 
Though the State and the dissent worry about gradations among 
children of different ages, that concern cannot justify ignoring a 
child’s age altogether. Just as police officers are competent to 
account for other objective circumstances that are a matter of 
degree such as the length of questioning or the number of 
officers present, so too are they competent to evaluate the effect 
of relative age.
323
 
The Court used the word “competent,”324 perhaps indirectly signaling 
normative reasons for focusing on police actions rather than suspects’ 
emotions. 
Normative approaches to imposing a “reasonable person” standard 
focus on the likelihood (or at least the hope) that court-imposed 
standards affect actor behavior in a manner that benefits society.
325
 Some 
assert that “normative definitions are categorically preferable to positive 
                                                     
315. Id. at 395–97. 
316. Id. at 388 (“Because the case comes to us from a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming 
the entry of a directed verdict for respondents, we take the evidence hereafter noted in the light most 
favorable to petitioner.”). 
317. Id. at 389. 
318. Id. at 398–99. 
319. See generally id. 
320. 564 U.S. 261 (2001). 
321. Id. at 274. 
322. Id. at 276. 
323. Id. at 279. 
324. Id. 
325. See generally Miller & Perry, supra note 108.  
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definitions” because grossly conflicting outcomes emerge when one 
assumes that members of a broad society will conform to a few basic 
axioms and act in a logically consistent manner.
326
 
From the normative perspective, then, is the purpose of the existing 
reasonable person standard to educate all Americans about how they 
should feel during a police interaction? In light of the research regarding 
instinctive responses to authority, such court-imposed instruction may 
not work.
327
 If instead the purpose is to protect citizens from over-
intrusion or optimize officer-civilian interactions, then focusing on the 
party who has greater control over the encounter makes more sense.
328
 
The courts may accomplish more by focusing on reasonable police 
actions. From an efficiency perspective, the police make up a small 
subpopulation
329
 that already attends police academy and continuing 
education sessions. Politeness and fair procedures impact citizens’ 
perception of police legitimacy and willingness to cooperate with police 
to solve crimes.
330
 Thus, encouraging police to maximize the comfort of 
conversational partners during social interactions may increase police 
productivity in addition to decreasing accusations of unwarranted 
seizure.
331
 
Courts using a new “reasonable officer” standard should ask 
questions focused on the officer-civilian interaction on a case-by-case 
basis—for example, whether officers blocking all the exits to a factory332 
                                                     
326. Id. at 326. 
327. See supra Part III. 
328. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CMTY. RELATIONS SERV., PRINCIPLES OF GOOD POLICING: 
AVOIDING VIOLENCE BETWEEN POLICE AND CITIZENS v (2003), https://www.justice.gov 
/archive/crs/pubs/principlesofgoodpolicingfinal092003.pdf [https://perma.cc/SF2Y-BBZR] (“[T]he 
police, by virtue of the authority that society vests in them, have overarching responsibility for the 
outcome of encounters with citizens.”).  
329. See BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., FEDERAL LAW 
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS, 2008, at 1 (June 2012), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ 
fleo08.pdf [https://perma.cc/DQK8-23C6] (reporting that, as of 2008, federal agencies employed 
120,000 full-time officers authorized to make arrests); BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 
BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., CENSUS OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, 2008, at 1 
(July 2011), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/csllea08.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z5RP-K4YW] 
(reporting that, as of 2008, state and local law enforcement employed about 765,000 full-time and 
44,000 part-time personnel with general arrest powers).  
330. See generally Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People 
Help the Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231 (2008). 
331. See id. 
332. See I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 221 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring). 
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or officers requesting and then retaining identification
333
 acted in a way 
that a reasonable officer having a social interaction would act. Shifting 
the inquiry to police choices will signal to officers that, when labeling an 
interaction “social,” the officer must choose an approach that reasonably 
appears social, rather than assuming it is the suspect’s responsibility to 
walk away.
334
 Encouraging these types of police choices could reduce 
confusion, increase perceived legitimacy, and indirectly reduce crime.
335
 
Washington courts already aim to focus on officer behavior to 
determine whether a social contact has escalated into a seizure.
336
 Other 
courts, including the United States Supreme Court, should follow 
Washington’s lead. Additionally, authors of future Washington opinions 
could take greater pains to avoid references to the suspect’s feelings or 
expected reaction and instead focus exclusively on the officers’ 
objective actions.
337
 Furthermore, in light of demonstrated tendencies to 
acquiesce to authority, as shown in the Milgram
338
 and Bickman
339
 
experiments—and as underscored in one update to the Milgram 
experiment in which a subject reported fear even absent any show of 
aggression from the overseer
340—all courts (and perhaps even 
                                                     
333. See generally Aidan Taft Grano, Casual or Coercive? Retention of Identification in Police-
Citizen Encounters, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1283 (2013) (discussing the split between the Fourth 
Circuit and the D.C. Circuit regarding whether retaining a pedestrian’s identification constitutes 
seizure). 
334. The “free-to-leave” standard arguably instructs civilians on when they should or should not 
feel comfort. Observing that a civilian who feels uncomfortable is simply behaving unreasonably 
harkens back to one infamous United States Supreme Court decision: Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 
537, 551 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (“We consider the 
underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced 
separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not 
by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that 
construction upon it.”).  
335. See Tyler & Fagan, supra note 330. 
336. State v. Young, 135 Wash. 2d 498, 501, 957 P.2d 681, 682 (1998). 
337. Compare State v. Harrington, 167 Wash. 2d 656, 665, 222 P.3d 92, 96 (2009) (“Analyzing 
this encounter under Washington’s purely objective standard, a reasonable person at the beginning 
of the conversation would not have thought [the officer] restrained that person’s freedom of 
movement.” (emphasis added)), with id. at 670, 222 P.3d at 98 (“A reasonable person would not 
have felt free to leave due to the officer’s display of authority.” (emphasis added)). The first 
phrasing focuses on what the officer did, whereas the second phrasing focuses on how a civilian 
might have felt about it. 
338. See MILGRAM, supra note 125, at 123 (“We have now seen several hundred participants in 
the obedience experiment, and we have witnessed a level of obedience to orders that is 
disturbing.”). 
339. See Bickman, supra note 126, at 47. 
340. See Burger, supra note 135. 
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legislatures
341
) may wish to reexamine the show of force necessary in 
order for a police officer to have seized a suspect. 
When drawing the line between social interactions and seizures, 
judges must balance the goals of protecting individual liberty and 
allowing police enough leeway to effectively fight crime.
342
 Previous 
attempts to rely on “gut” instincts regarding suspects’ comfort levels 
have resulted in strained assumptions that may not reflect average 
civilians’ actual attitudes.343 Yet attempts to measure civilian reactions 
run into roadblocks due to overestimation of willingness to resist 
authority
344
 as well as difficulties collecting accurate data.
345
 Putting the 
spotlight on objective officer behavior would focus analysis on what 
officers may do rather than on what civilians may feel. 
CONCLUSION 
The United States Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of 
Washington have set a seizure standard without the benefit of robust 
social science research.
346
 Kessler’s 2009 study attempted to shed light 
on when the typical person feels comfortable refusing to answer police 
questions, and thus when a “real” reasonable person might actually feel 
seized—contrasting with courts’ prior assumptions about a reasonable 
person’s attitude toward questioning.347 This Comment compares the 
Kessler results
348
 to new data gathered within Washington State. The 
new data do not support changing the current standard based on obvious, 
externally-identifiable characteristics, with the exception of some 
indication that attitudes may differ based on gender.
349
 Qualitative 
information that emerged during the study, however, may point toward 
allowing juries to consider indicators of vulnerability for some suspect 
                                                     
341. Cf. David. M. Jaros, Preempting the Police, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1149, 1184 (2014) (discussing a 
successful Maryland legislative effort to block unnecessary DNA collection by police). 
342. See supra Introduction. 
343. See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 438 (1991) (explaining that a seat-bound 
passenger on a long-distance bus ride would feel free to refuse to interact with an immediately 
adjacent police officer). 
344. See supra Part III. 
345. See supra section VI.A. and Part V. 
346. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (plurality opinion) (setting a 
standard that a person is seized if a reasonable person would not feel free to leave). 
347. See supra Part I. 
348. See supra Part V. 
349. See supra Part V. 
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categories.
350
 Future research is needed, but researchers will face 
difficulties gathering accurate data.
351
 Courts would do better to clarify 
and emphasize the standard for the “reasonable police officer” during a 
seizure rather than focusing on the behavior of a seized defendant.
352
 
                                                     
350. See supra section IV.B.2. 
351. See supra section VI.A. 
352. See supra section VI.B. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A 
Kessler 2009 Survey Questions 
1. You are walking on the sidewalk. A police officer comes up to you 
and says, “I have a few questions to ask you.” Assume you do not want 
to talk to the officer. 
On a scale of 1 to 5, please indicate how free you would feel to walk 
away without answering or to decline to talk with the police officer. 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5 
Not free 
to leave or say no 
Somewhat free 
to leave or say no 
Completely free 
to leave or say no 
   
 
2. You are riding the bus. A police officer comes up to you and says, “I 
have a few questions to ask you.” Assume you do not want to talk to the 
officer. 
On a scale of 1 to 5, please indicate how free you would feel to walk 
away without answering or to decline to talk with the police officer. 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5 
Not free 
to leave or say no 
Somewhat free 
to leave or say no 
Completely free 
to leave or say no 
 
Which sentence best describes your legal rights in each of the above 
situations? 
 
1. You have the legal duty to talk with the officer even if you do not 
want to. 
2. You have a legal duty to be reasonably helpful to the officer, but 
may leave in some situations. 
3. You have a legal right to ignore the officer, but he may assume you 
are guilty of wrongdoing if you do. 
4. You have the legal right to refuse to talk with the officer with no 
consequence to yourself. 
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Please provide the following demographic information: 
Age: _______Zip Code: _______ 
 
Have you ever been stopped before by a police officer? _____ 
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Appendix B  
Fall 2015 Survey Questions for Telephone Survey and Addiction 
Recovery Survey 
 
Thank you for answering a few questions. Your participation is 
voluntary, and your identity will be kept completely anonymous.  
 
A. Imagine you are walking on the sidewalk. A police officer comes up 
to you and says, “I have a few questions to ask you.” Assume you do not 
want to talk to the officer. 
On a scale of 1 to 5, please indicate how free you would feel to walk 
away without answering or to decline to talk with the police officer. 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5 
Not free 
to leave or say no 
Somewhat free 
to leave or say no 
Completely free 
to leave or say no 
 
B. Imagine you are riding the bus. A police officer comes up to you and 
says, “I have a few questions to ask you.” Assume you do not want to 
talk to the officer. 
On a scale of 1 to 5, please indicate how free you would feel to walk 
away without answering or to decline to talk with the police officer. 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5 
Not free 
to leave or say no 
Somewhat free 
to leave or say no 
Completely free 
to leave or say no 
 
C. Which sentence best describes your legal situation in each of the 
above scenarios? 
1. You have the legal duty to talk with the officer even if you do not 
want to. 
2. You have a legal duty to be reasonably helpful to the officer, but 
may leave in some situations. 
3. You have a legal right to ignore the officer, but he may assume you 
are guilty of wrongdoing if you do. 
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4. You have the legal right to refuse to talk with the officer with no 
consequence to yourself. 
 
Please provide the following demographic information: 
Age: _______ 
Zip Code: ___________ 
Race/ethnicity: ____________________________    
Gender:________ 
 
Education (circle one): 
Did not finish high school  
High school/GED  
Some college/vocational school 
2-year college degree  
4-year college degree 
More than 4-year college degree  
 
Other than for a traffic violation, have you ever been stopped by a police 
officer? _____ 
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Appendix C 
Telephone Survey of Washington Voters Methodology 
The researcher paid Elway Research, Inc. to ask proprietary 
questions with wording nearly identical to the questions used in the 
Kessler study.
353
 Elway asked the questions during its statewide 
telephone poll, conducted October 13–15, 2015.354 The poll drew from a 
pre-selected randomized sample of registered voters from across 
Washington State. Live interviewers made the calls, and 28% of calls 
went to cell phones. Of the 500 respondents, 54% were female, 46% 
were male. Respondents were 31% from King County, 49% from the 
remainder of Western Washington, and 20% from Eastern Washington. 
The voter sample had very few non-White respondents (87% Caucasian, 
compared to 77.7% Caucasian in the Kessler sample
355
), and only 7% of 
respondents were under age thirty-five (compared to 26.7% of 
respondents in the fifteen to twenty-four age range in the Kessler 
sample
356
). The margin of sampling error is plus or minus 4.5% at the 
95% confidence level. 
 
  
                                                     
353 See supra section III.D. 
354 See The Elway Poll, ELWAY RESEARCH, INC., http://www.elwayresearch.com/elwaypoll.html 
[https://perma.cc/9GY2-3JES]. 
355 See Kessler supra note 23, at 73–74. 
356 Id. 
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Appendix D 
Recovery Center Survey Methodology 
The researcher expected to enter a classroom during a time-
limited session, briefly introduce the survey process, pass out a large 
number of written questionnaires, and then collect anonymously 
completed forms and depart. However, the survey setting proved 
different when the researcher entered the facility and observed a large 
buffet with clients socializing at spread-out tables. A staff member rang 
a bell and called the room to attention, and the researcher explained the 
survey. Center clients joined the researcher in a side room a few at a 
time. Those who completed the survey returned to the dining area and 
encouraged their associates to participate. The researcher offered those 
who participated a small dessert (a cookie or piece of candy) as an 
incentive. 
Calculating the sample size, thirty-seven, simply involved 
counting the survey sheets, but the flow of buffet patrons in and out of 
the building—and the need to avoid pressuring members of a vulnerable 
population—complicated participation rate calculation. The researcher 
could not pinpoint exactly how many people in the room heard the initial 
announcement or follow-up invitations from their associates. The 
researcher received twenty-five responses from approximately fifty 
Wednesday buffet patrons and twelve responses from fewer than forty 
Friday buffet patrons—partly due to repeat buffet attendees not taking 
the survey twice. Thus, during the Friday visit, the response rate of those 
eligible to complete the survey was likely 50%, similar to Wednesday’s 
rate. 
 
 
